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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Marx once stated "the ruling ideas of an epoch are the ideas of
the ruling class." Many questions of theoretical and practical concern
are raised with this statement. The most fundamental question concerns
the relationship between ideology and class structure. One must under-
stand the meaning of this essential tenet of marxism, if one hopes to
develop a successful marxist revolutionary project. A central theme of
this paper is that Bukharin failed to appreciate the dialectical charac-
ter of marxism. This theoretical error is associated with his failure
in praxis during the period of New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union.
Mar::' s theory of ideology will be used therefore as a philosophical base,
or better still a starting point, from which I will examine critically
Bukharin' 3 praxis during NEP. I rely heavily upon Antonio Gramsci's
cricique of Bukharin' s marxism. In using this critique, I will
establish a concrete association between Bukharin' s positivism and his
failure in praxis during NEP.
The period of New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union began in
1921 with Lenin's substitution of a tax in kind for the requisitioning
of grain. It ended abruptly in 1929 with Stalin's all out collectivi-
zation drive. Robert Tucker, a foremost scholar in the area, has
declared recently that this abrupt turn in Soviet aistory is best
2
understood as "Stalin's revolution from above. Other scholars view
Bukharin's leadership as a legitimate alternative to Stalin's murderous
3
collectivization effort. The purpose of this paper is to contribute
further to an understanding of the discontinuity which exists between
NEP and collectivization. Since Bukharin was the recognized theoretician
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he played a crucial role in
the dissemination of socialist ideology to the people of the Soviet
Union. The question I hope to answer is: How is the content of
Bukharin's theoretical marxism related to the failure of his leadership
praxis during NEP?
In general terms, the purpose of this essay is to account for
Bukharin's praxis during the period of New Economic Policy in the
Soviet Union using Marx's theory of ideology as a base from which
Gramsci makes his critique. The essay will consist of four chapters
other than the introduction and the conclusion. These chapters include:
Marx's theory of ideology; Bukharin's praxis during NEP; Gramsci 's
critique of Bukharin's historical materialism; and the link between
Bukharin's positivism and his praxis. In the chapter dealing with
Marx's theory of ideology, I will cast away his Feuerbachian materialism
and establish the marxian dialectic. Three related discussions continue
in the chapter on Bukharin where I discuss the social context of NEP,
Bukharin's equilibrium theory, and his praxis in the 1920' s. The
chapter on Gramsci' s critique of Bukharin deals primarily with a set of
notes Gramsci wrote while incarcerated at Turi di Bari by the Fascist
Mussolini government. These particular notes deal specifically with
Bukharin's book, Historical Materialism: A Study of Sociology . Also
included in this chapter will be a selection of other writings by
Gramsci on the Soviet Union. In the next chapter, I will link the
party/bureaucracy contradiction discussed in Chapter III with Bukharin's
positivism. Finally, the conclusion will consist of bringing everything
together in a succinct summary which will entail some rather critical
suggestions for liberation movements both within the confines of
sociology and the everyday work world today.
Methodology
Generally speaking, this study is a critical examination of a
particular historical moment. Critical methodology, if you will,
involves the discovery of both the real substance and the illusory form
of an historical moment. Each, to say the least, manifest contradictory
features which can only be understood as integral to the whole moment.
While each gives way to the ether, they mutually interact in conflicting
manner. The dialectic here is not simply this easily identifiable
interaction, but also and I think most important, the form of thought
which allows us to see human development in this way. The theoretical
concepts used to understand this moment are my constructions. They are
not inherent to the period. As afterthoughts, these constructions help
integrate the whole of the period, whereas during the period itself,
things may seem less clear. Therefore, one should be careful not to
confuse the theoretical constructions I use with the actual flow of
events during NEP.
In my opinion, the purpose of historical sociology is to identify
a particular historical moment in its contradictory totality. Doing
this, however, involves a politicization of history from the political
perspective of the sociologist. One can never hope to capture the total
essence of an historical period; one does attempt rather to identify the
predominant currents of the thought and the most essential concrete
manifestations of human action. Intertwined with thought and action is
praxis. Praxis is the dialectic. To identify praxis in history is the
correct dialectical perspective. Anyone approaching the following
material with this perspective should find my historical and sociological
reconstruction of NEP and Bukharin's praxis a feasible one. Someone
from a different perspective may therefore object to my selected inter-
pretation. I welcome your discussion since such debate is essential in
the development of our historical consciousness.
CHAPTER II
MARX'S THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
Introduction
Marx's theory of ideology should first be examined in its
theoretical explication and then in its practical implication. Doing
this allows us a cushion against which we may test Gramsci's critique
of Bukharin's sociology. If the statement "the ruling ideas of an
epoch are the ideas of the ruling class" concretizes the whole of Marx's
theory cf ideology, then it becomes fundamentally important to elaborate
the many elements of this proposition. Central to the relationship
between ideology and class structure is the mediation of class struggle
in forming not merely a more coherent ideology but a specifiable and
immediately recognizable class structure. Thus, class struggle mediates
the changing class structure of society as well as the articulation of
specific class ideologies.
When examining this proposition one must ask at least four
questions. These questions revolve around the broadest of inquiry,
philosophy, but simultaneously involve the areas of economics, politics,
and history. For example, when one speaks of ideas, do we not ask the
origin of these ideas and the manner in which they influence human
activity? In other words, we must establish the foundation upon which
human beings act. On the one hand, human beings act in a particular
manner contingent upon the production of life itself, and on the other,
this action confirms the reproduction of life. Through this dual-sided
process of production and reproduction of life, an equally important
belief system - ideas and ideology - arises. Although this ideology
depends upon and is intrinsic to the mode of production, it also re-
represents a dual-sided process. On the one hand, ideology serves to
reaffirm the process of production and on the other, it disguises the
nature of that production. It therefore becomes necessary to establish
the linkage between production of life and ideology. Class struggle is
central in this linkage.
When inquiring into the mode of this class struggle are we net
asking both an economic and a political question? That is to say, when
one suggests the existence of a 'ruling class' we must discuss simul-
taneously the question - what does it mean to rule and particularly to
rule as a class? Are we not then suggesting the conscious understanding
of the ruling class in protecting its system of economic exploitation
through the form of the state? Again these questions represent a dual-
sided process. The mode of production of life gives rise to the
formation of specific class relationships which are diametrically
opposed to one another, and yet must represent a mutual interdependence
and identity. How would it be otherwise for the development of human
society if there were not both constant antagonism between classes of
people and their mutual identity in society as a whole? Indeed, if we
do not understand the unity of these opposites, then consideration of
only the former would result in obliteration of the human race, and
consideration of the latter would result in a classless society. Thus,
the question is economic in the sense that specific class relationships
arise in the social intercourse of production. It is political in the
sense that these contradictory social relations of production manifest
themselves through the struggle for control of the state. Therefore, in
discussing the ruling class, ruling ideas, and the state, I will again
assert the centrality of class struggle.
The abstractness of the above questions could lead to a positivis-
tic bias unless we properly understand the element of history. By this,
I mean that the forms of ideology, class struggle, and state, and the
mode of production are all developing historically, i.e., these specific
forms change in relation to one another as each develops. And of
critical importance to us here is the understanding of the historical
specificity of the smychka in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the ideology
we speak of represents the specific development of the New Economic
Policy and the modes of class struggle which are specific to this
period. Thus, history provides us with the practical understanding of
theory and therefore permits us to choose how to act—for if "men make
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please" because
circumstances have been "transmitted from the past", then indeed we can
choose to make history only to the extent that we act in accordance
with past and present circumstances. It is in this spirit that the
eleventh of the Theses on Feuerbach was written.
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point, however, is to change it.^
Changing the world, however, has not been any simple process.
Certainly it hasn't matched the ease of interpreting the world. Marx
8left no specific doctrines on tactics, methods and such stuff, although
one major tenet of dialectical materialism says human action (or
interaction with nature) is itself a process of social change. But this
is nothing more than a general philosophic point of view, even though
a radical and revolutionary one for the time. When you add the sociolo-
gical concepts of time and context to the notion of creation, dialectical
materialism contains the element of historical specificity.
The development of a new world view, not to mention the arduous
task of raising the popular masses of people to that world view, is not
complete simply with the organized will of the uprising classes in the
form of the state. This organized will must be able to articulate the
needs of what are usually weary or segmented classes. It must mold
these classes with the new world view in such a manner as to reflect
the potential of the economic conditions of the nation. It must bring
forth a freshly born nation and establish order in what otherwise would
be chaos. This order, of course, reflects the new world view, integrates
the polity with new relations of production, and establishes normalacy
in the everyday behavior of people. Although experimentation continues,
it is done within the framework of a newly established ideology and socio-
economic order.
The tasks confronting the Communist Party during NEP were
enormous. Not only did they have the technological/scientific details
of heavy industry to deal with, but they had the problems of enjoining
the peasantry to the world view of socialism. The latter task alone
proved to be the major organic hurdle during NEP, A hurdle, I might
add, which was only overcome with the annihilation of the peasantry as a
class by "Stalin's revolution from above". That is not to say the
collectivization drives were the only feasible alternative, for then
history loses all trace of meaning. Meaningful history is the discussion
of relevant alternatives. Alternatives are praxis, the human construc-
tion of society; history is alternatives and thus history is praxis.
Bukharin's alternative is the one which especially interests us here.
The Philosophical Element
Marx states in The German Ideology ;
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious
existence,, and the existence of men is their actual life pro-
cess. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear
upside down as in a camera obscura , this phenomenon arises
just as much from their historical life-process as the in-
version of objects on the retina does from their physical
life-process. In direct contrast to German philosophy which
descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to
heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say,
imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, im-
agined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh.
We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their
real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideo-
logical reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms
formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of
their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable
and bound to material premises.
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At this stage of his development Marx had not advanced his theory beyond
that of the vulgar materialists he so ruthlessly criticized. The
German Ideology presents a theory of ideology which is but a mere
reflection of matter. This creates several problems. If human beings
can consciously interpret history, i.e., if we can discover the rational-
ity of history which on the surface appears all too irrational, then
10
human beings have a consciousness. This consciousness cannot be merely
a reflection of matter but rather a consciousness of equal importance
to matter. Human discovery can only be understood then to mean the
conscious interpretation of matter for human needs. Just as matter
develops and changes, so does our consciousness. Matter and conscious-
ness thus come together in practical activity. This is what Marx means
when he says, "circumstances make men just as much as men make
circumstances." Although this quote is also taken from The German
Ideology
,
Marx does not develop it to the extent of making consciousness
of equal importance to matter.
Lichtman criticizes Marx on this point in The German Ideology .
Marx has attempted to resolve the difficulty of synthesizing
"reflection" and "inversion" by producing a simple copy theory
of knowledge, and then adding the twist of negating the copy.
It remains a picture theory. Crude empiricism holds that
knowledge is a copy of reality; Marx holds, in this analysis,
that ideology is a copy of reality, but one that has been
reversed.
5
Mepharo similarly criticizes the vulgar materialism of Marx in this
quote and adds two more criticisms. First, he argues that the metaphors
used by Marx confuse the nature of what he is trying to say. Second, he
finds an element of positivism in the early Marx. Both Mepham and
Lichtman argue that contemporary marxist theory and practice suffers
as a result of the relatively undeveloped nature of the marxian system
in The German Ideologv.
This critique of Marx (with which I agree) represents neither a
total rejection of the early Marx nor an argument that there exists a
fundamental break between the early and later Marx. Rather, it suggests
11
a fundamental unity in his thought which is treated systematically in
later years. The relation between thought and matter, i.e., the philoso-
phical element, can be found in a passage from the first volume of
Capital .
In Capital , Marx rejects the simple "copy theory" of knowledge,
and argues instead the dialectical unity of thought and matter. This
unity still expresses itself in practical activity, and thus we see the
continuity in Marx's thought.
A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a
weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect, in the
construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst
architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect
raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in
reality. At the end of every labor-process, we get a result
that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at
its commencement.
7
Here Marx points out much more than the difference between human beings
and bees. He is arguing that the unity of human essence comes about
in the dual process of thinking and action, of imagination and construc-
tion, of consciousness and matter. And these dual elements only come
together through the conscious effort of practical activity exerted
upon nature, and for human needs.
The Economic and Political Elements
The second and third elements of the proposition, i.e., the eco-
nomic and political, concern the concept "ruling class." This concept
is related to the philosophical question of the relation between thought
and matter, ideology and production, in the sense that it brings together
the contradictory nature of production, and elevates the contradiction
12
to a superstructural level. At the supers true tural level, then, the
contradiction manifested in the structure of production takes shape as
a contradiction between two classes: those who rule and those who are
ruled.
Edward Andrew puts it quite succinctly:
Classes, then, are basically economic relationships, not
in the utilitarian sense of economic as the means of life,
but in the sense of production of life. However classes are
not, for Marx, just relations of production; they also have
ideological and political dimensions.
°
Again we will distinguish between the early and later Marx.
In The German Ideology
,
Marx states:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling
ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of
society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.
The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of
mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are
subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the
ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one,
therefore, the ideas of its dominance,
9
It would appear as if Marx is arguing that the ruling class controls
the ideas that permeate society. If this were so, then it implies
the passive acceptance of these ideas by the working class. In other
words, Marx distinguishes between production and ideas, and therefore
argues that the only linkage between the two is the ruling class which
disseminates these ideas to the rest of society. In The Communist
Manifesto he argues nearly the same thing, but we get a clearer picture
of the nature of ideas.
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Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of
your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your
jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law
for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are
determined by the economical conditions of existence of your
class. .. .What else does the history of ideas prove, than that
intellectual production changes its character in proportion
as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each
age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class. 10
The picture presented here suggests the following: that the ideas of
the capitalist epoch are the ideas which correspond to the production and
reproduction of capital; therefore, it is not the capitalist class which
produces ideas but the bourgeois society; and thus, since the capitalist
class is the ruling class and since tney own the means of production,
the ideas of this age also belong to them. Now this is not to argue
that the working class does not help to reproduce the ideology of
bourgeois society, but rather to indicate the class which benefits from
these ideas. Neither is it my intent to argue that the capitalist class
does not control the means by which bourgeois ideology is transmitted to
the whole of society. Nor will I argue that they do not consciously use
every institution in society to defend their interests as the ruling
class. On the contrary, I merely point to the fact that bourgeois
society produces these ideas. And although they are in the interests of
the capitalist class, these ideas have their origin in the actual life
process of production. Bourgeois ideology, expressed in one of its
present forms, consumerism, may appear autonomous from the actual day-
to-day production process. It is, however, the ideological presentation
of social relations in capitalist production. The ideology of consumer-
ism provides artificial (or illusory) meaning to the meaningless and
14
alienating aspects of capitalist production. It integrates our day-to-
day behavior into the social relations of capitalist production and thus
disguises the contradictory nature of that production. Since the working
class acts within the context of this production, they share to some de-
gree the production of ideas. This is not to argue the passivity of the
working class, but only to indicate that working class struggles within
the confines of bourgeois production and its various legal forms, help
to reproduce the dominance of bourgeois ideology. As John Hepham states:
To say that the bourgeoisie produces ideas is to ignore
the conditions that make this possible, to ignore that which
determines which ideas are thus produced, and to conceal the
real nature and origins of ideology. It is not the bourgeois
class that produces ideas but bourgeois society. **
The class struggle taking place in the process of commodity pro-
duction, i.e., determinant class relations based upon a constant antagon-
ism between those who sell their labor power and those who employ
capital, links itself via the fetishism of commodities to the state and
whole of society. Commodity fetishism disguises the substance of capi-
talist social relations. Instead of conflicting class relations
manifesting openly in the superstructure, political leaders of the
ruling class speak of the "nation's common good", a good which essentially
denies working class interests. Commodity fetishism thus disguises
class struggle. This struggle then produces the various forms within
the superstructure and thereby carries the fetishism with it. Thus,
class struggle establishes the linkage between production and ideology.
In the third volume of Capital Marx argues this point.
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The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labor
is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relation-
ship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of pro-
duction itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining
element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation
of the economic community which grows out of the production
relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific
political form. It is always the direct relationship of the
owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers -
a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage
in the development of the methods of labor and thereby its
social productivity - which reveals the innermost secret, the
hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence,
in short, the corresponding form of the state. 12
The centrality of class struggle at the production level thus determines
the form of class struggle throughout the social structure. That form
is political, according to Marx. Lichtman concludes "the concrete form
of ideology embedded in the extraction of surplus labor will permeate
and determine the nature of consciousness in the 'entire social
,,.13
structure.
Whereas in the early Marx it seems as though the ruling class
simply controls ideology, he now argues in Capital that class struggle
determines the form and content of ideology and the state. Because
Marx argues the dual-sided nature of class struggle, i.e., at the level
of production which determines the form of the state, and the manifesta-
tion of that struggle throughout the rest of the social system which
reacts upon the struggle going on in production, his argument becomes
more powerful. It is powerful in the sense that (.1) it can better
explain the nature of ideology and (2) it informs conscious revolution-
aries of the appropriate tactics necessary to overthrow bourgeois
hegemony. For example, Lenin correctly recognized the permeation of
16
bourgeois ideology, when he argued in What Is To Be Done that "the
spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its
14
becoming subordinated to the bourgeois ideology." Thus, working
class struggle confined to the arena of labor union negotiation remains
within the boundaries of bourgeois hegemony. The reason of course has
to do with the nature of production - its illusory visibility and the
subsequent spontaneous revolt of the working class to it.
It is, therefore, necessary to explain how bourgeois ideology is
intrinsic to the nature of commodity production. Marx powerfully demon-
strates this point in his chapter, "Fetishism of Commodities and the
Secret Thereof," from the first volume of Capital . In locating the
source of ideology, Marx distinguishes between the substance and the
form of commodity production. For example, the substance of a commodity
is its use-value, which represents utility in the quality of differen-
tiated labor. The form of the commodity is its exchange-value, which
represents the quantity of abstract human labor contained within it.
When commodities are thus exchanged, and they can only be exchanged when
there is a universal equivalent for exchange, i.e., money, the embryonic
social relationship of society establishes itself in a fetishism. This
fetishism disguises the essential character of human relationships by
making the exchange of commodities appear as social relations rather
than relations between things. Thus, human relations establish them-
selves only through the exchange of commodities, and therefore, immediate
perception gives rise to an ideology.
17
A commodity is therefore a mystical thing, simply because
in it the social character of men's labour appears to them
as an objective character stamped upon the product of that
labour: because the relation of the producers to the sum
total of their own labour is presented to them as a social
relation, existing not between themselves, but between the
products of their labour. This is the reason why the pro-
ducts of labour become commodities, social things whose
qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible
to the senses. .. .This is a definite social relation between
men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a
relation between things. .. .This I call the Fetishism which
attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they
are produced as commodities, and which is therefore insepar-
able from the production of commodities. J
Marx correctly locates the linkage between production and ideology in
the actual life process of production and exchange of commodities. He
doesn' t separate the two and thus in Capital
,
ideology is no longer a
reflection of matter but bound to the labouring process. Ideology
produces production just as much as production produces ideology.
Mepham states "the function of ideology is to keep hidden the real
social relations."
....the theory says that it is a feature of social life
and in particular the life of social production, that it
is so structured as to render that social reality sometimes
opaque to its participants. The invisibility of real rel-
ations derives from the visibility of outward appearances
or forms. The apparent immediacy of these forms obscures
their mystif icatory character.-'-'
Due to the nature of commodity production and the consequent invisibility
of real relations and visibility of forms, ideology permeates the social
and political institutions of capitalist society. However, to under-
stand the dynamics by which ideology is transferred to the superstructure
of society is to understand the nature of ideology, and thus, the
meaning of this statement by Marx:
"But every class struggle is a political struggle."
18
Historical Element
In the introduction to Marx's great uncompleted work Grundrisse
,
he lays the groundwork for his method of analysis. As he outlines this
method, he critiques the mechanical and positivistic political-economists
They make the mistake of looking at reality in its present form without
considering the fact that humanity, human society, and culture are
historically developing. They therefore only see outward appearances
and are thus caught in the narrow bourgeois trap of ideology. They
never look beneath the surface of reality, i.e., the form, to discover
the substance of specific and historically developing society.
Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is
always production at a definite stage of social development -
production by social individuals. It might seem, therefore,
that in order to talk about production at all we must either
pursue the process of historic development through its dif-
ferent phases, or declare beforehand that we are dealing with
a specific historic epoch such as e.g. modern bourgeois pro-
duction, which is indeed our particular theme. However, all
epochs of production have certain common traits, common
characteristics. Production in general is abstraction, but a
rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and
fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still,
this general category, this common element sifted out by
comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits
into different determinations. Some determinations belong to
all epochs, others only to a few. (Some) determinations will
be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No
production will be thinkable without them; however, even though
the most developed languages have laws and characteristics in
common with the least developed, nevertheless, just those things
which determine their development, i.e., the elements which are
not general and common, must be separated out from the determi-
nations valid for production as such, so that in their unity -
which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity,
and of the object, nature - their essential difference is not
forgotten. The whole profundity of those modern economists who
demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of the existing
social relations lies in this forgetting. ^9
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While looking for the most general characteristics of production through-
out history, the positivists eternalize capitalist production. They
forget the historical specificity of all epochs and thus they flounder
in superficial analysis. To discover the specific relationships in-
volved in any epoch is to discover the system which lies behind the forms
so readily present in everyday life. The historical element in Marx's
theory of ideology makes history relative. It grasps the substance of
an historical moment, rather than glossing over it in some attempt to
eternalize social relations. It grasps the discontinuity of an age and
thus provides a basis for a meaningful revolutionary project. Without
this meaning we are but passive observers of the historical process.
The Totality of the Capitalist System Through Class Struggle
The unity of the relationship between matter and thought is
realized in practical activity, praxis. Both have their origin in
practical activity. Matter, therefore, is not inanimate but the
technological part of the forces of production. Thought, therefore, is
not passive reflection of this matter, but the active manipulation of
it. The ideological component takes form in the entirety of society
in general and the state in particular.
Class struggle within the production of commodities links the
ideological component of production to the state and thereby transforms
that struggle into a political struggle. This political struggle con-
sists of two classes of people who stand diametrically opposed to each
other - the capitalist class and the working class. It is here that the
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battle for domination takes form. The battle is for control of both the
state and ideology. Therefore, the rulers, those who own the ideas of
an epoch, stand in opposition to the ruled, those who are fighting for
control, who are making the new society, and consequently those who will
control the new ideas.
The history of an epoch is just as much the history of its ideas
as it is the history of its material production. We thus consciously
understand the changing nature of production and ideology. This histori-
cal consciousness allows the revolutionary to develop meaningful praxis.
Lichtman sums up quite well the totality of capitalist production.
I think ic is clear that throughout the entire analysis of
fetishism in Capital, Marx treats the mystification of con-
sciousness as intrinsic to the form of capitalist production.
The position of The German Ideology is transformed. It is no
longer merely the case that economic power confers power over
intellectual production wich is 'falsified 1 for the purpose
of social control. The account is now much more profound.
Ideology is generated out of the mode of production itself.
And because the nature of exploitation that is crucial to the
mode of production reveals how and why the capitalist class
makes use of its power over intellectual production. The
capitalist class institutionalizes consciousness as it does
because it must. The fetishism originating in the commodity
form is transmitted throughout the remaining social institu-
tions, affecting each in a distinctly relevant way. Each
institution in the structure of the hierarchy provides its
own mystification. 20
From Theory to Praxis
Moving from theory to praxis is not a simple linear equation but
rather a complex and difficult process. Praxis should be as much
differentiated from theory as theory is from reality. As the unity of
the abstract and concrete, praxis represents human will attempting to
achieve certain effects within a defined structural limitation. These
effects are qualitatively different from both theory and reality, owing
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to the fact that the goal of praxis is ultimately to transform reality
and hence theory.
Praxis evolves continually in the on-going struggle of political-
economy. In this respect, the praxis of a subordinate class during
periods of relative harmony will differ from the praxis of the same
group in times of crisis. Furthermore, if the subordinate group becomes
the ruling group, as is the case in this investigation, their praxis
will differ equally as much from previous forms of praxis. Since this is
our case, perhaps a few comments about Bolshevik praxis during NEP will
benefit the reader.
On the one hand, praxis cannot rely primarily upon structural
changes in the political-economy of a nation. Structural changes include
a realignment of class forces in production (as well as the dependent
technological innovations introduced after the revolution) . After the
October Revolution, the major class realignment, of course, was the
proletarian alliance with the peasantry as expressed in the organized
will of the Bolshevik Party through the state. The political-economic
structure of the Soviet Union was defined by the New Economic Policy.
It was a dual economy where the state (i.e. the alliance) owned large
capital industry and the private citizen owned small industry and
agriculture. NEP had essentially a public and a private sector; a dual
economy. NEP was not therefore a purely socialist economy; neither was
it a purely capitalist economy; it was a mixture of both. Bolshevik
praxis was directed towards a more complete socialist political-economy
under the defined structural limitations of NEP. The attempt to
22
introduce cooperative and collective farming into the agricultural
sector of the Soviet Union was an example of Bolshevik praxis during
NEP.
On the other hand, praxis cannot rely primarily upon super-
structural changes in the political-economy of a nation. Superstructural
changes include the reorientation of social thought, the development of
new codes of behavior, and the acceptance of these by the popular masses
in their day-to-day activity. In other words, a superstructural change
involves the development of a comprehensive new world outlook or culture
which integrates the normal behavior of the average citizen into the
newly developed social relations of production. As such, it is broad
cultural change manifested in various superstructural institutions like
education, the family, and the polity. During NEP the Bolsheviks intro-
duced many new ideas which centered around a cooperative and collecti-
vist society. In education, they worked with the problems of literacy.
In the family, they liberalized divorce proceedings and equalized
male-female role relationships. These changes rely not only upon cog-
nitive, but most importantly, attitudinal acceptance. Unfortunately,
the latter is usually the more difficult to achieve. In the polity,
however, the Bolsheviks simply took over the existing political structure
of the Tsarist regime. Although they recognized this problem, they
seemed most reluctant to introduce radical changes into the polity
during the development of NEP. In the following chapter, I concentrate
on this error.
On the whole, praxis is a dual process which concentrates on
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both structural and superstructural change. Again, it is the relation-
ship between thought and matter. Both are equally important, despite
the fact that superstructural change is probably more difficult than
structural change. Structural change can often be legislated whereas
superstructural change nearly always relies upon popular acceptance in
the attitudes of the masses. Structure may be forceful, even brutally
coercive, but an idea must be subtle to the extent that we actively
support it.
In Chapter III, I will examine Bolshevik praxis in more detail.
This will involve a rather extensive examination of the structure, as
well as the superstructure of NEP. I hope to point out what in my
opinion is the decisive contradiction in Bolshevik praxis. I call it
the party/bureaucracy contradiction. In further chapters I will
identify the association between this contradiction and Bukharin's
positivism. As such, I concentrate chiefly upon Bukharin's leadership
within the Bolshevik Party.
CHAPTER III
BUKHARIN'S LEADERSHIP PRAXIS DURING THE
PERIOD OF NEW ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION
New Economic Policy-Legitimation and Crisis: A Framework for Analysis
Gramsci once reflected upon the transition phase in a revolu-
tionary period.
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is
dying and the new cannot be born. In this interregnum the
most varied of morbid phenomena appear.
^
This description is quite fitting for NEP. Indeed, NEP is aptly
characterized by crisis. But this crisis is not overtly manifest in the
sense that there is the complete absence of political and cultural
hegemony. Rather, NEP represents a form of submerged hegemonic crisis
in the sense that the existing political and cultural leadership is
attempting to enthuse the masses with a socialist spirit. Submerged
hegemonic crisis, then, is that period in the revolution where the
political and cultural leadership of the newly formed state attempts to
enlist the active and willing support of the masses.
Hegemony refers to the active and willing support of the dominant
classes as well as the subordinate classes. The intellectuals, whether
they are literary, industrial, or political, play a crucial role in the
development of hegemony. We will concentrate chiefly upon the political
intellectuals in the Soviet Union.
The dictatorship of the proletariat best characterized this
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transicion period. In Che Soviet Union, this dictatorship was the
alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry (smychka ) . The poli-
tical will of the smychka was organized and expressed through the
Bolshevik Party. The primary goal of this will was to envelope gradually
the spirit of the masses with a socialist ideology. They had to con-
vince the whole of the Soviet Union of its culture and ideas. Again,
Gramsci offers a superb summary of this revolutionary process.
A social class cannot convince others of the validity of
its world view until it is fully convinced itself. Once this
is achieved, society enters a period of relative tranquility,
in which hegemony rather than dictatorship is the prevailing
form of rule.
2
The dictatorship of the smychka , then, is this submerged hegemonic
crisis. The process of moving from dictatorship to hegemony is not
achieved simply through the prescription of established patterns. It is
achieved rather through the on-going struggle of strategy accepted and
rejected, of movement forward and backward., and of all the various
victories and setbacks. It is, in a word, the struggle for legitimation
in the popular will of the masses. When trouble appears in this legiti-
mation struggle, the submerged crisis surfaces in the superstructure,
usually the polity. The manner in which the crisis is dealt with is
crucial in the development of hegemony. The argument put forward in this
chapter is that the Bolsheviks dealt with this crisis in such a manner
so as to preclude the successful transition to hegemony. Indeed,
Stalin's "revolution from above" represented a coercive and brutal ex-
tension of the dictatorship which destroyed the will of the smychka .
Stalin's heinous solution to the submerged hegemonic crisis ended the
26
period of New Economic Policy, as well as any expression of popular will
3in the smychka .
Marx, in reflecting upon Hegel and the French Revolution of 1848,
once commented
:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given
and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.
And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves
and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in
such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up
the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them
names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new
scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this
borrowed language.^
In my opinion, Marx's comment could just as well have been said in
reference to Stalin's "revolution from above."
Two major contradictions in the society of the Soviet Union con-
tributed to the emergence of hegemonic crisis during NEP, The first
contradiction consists in the alarming cultural differentiation between
the proletariat and the peasantry, Although they formed an alliance,
the smychka was primarily the expression of Bolshevik policy. Hence, the
smychka was a formal will expressed through party activity and not an
organic will expressed through the popular and active participation of
the masses. I consider this an interparty contradiction since it is a
contradictory relation between the party and the masses. NEP, therefore,
represents the attempt to overcome this contradiction.
The second contradiction consists in the interplay between the
party and the bureaucracy. Discussions about the correct implementation
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of NEP, usually referred to as the industrialization debates, created
factions within the party. In the struggle to see their ideas implement-
ed, left and right factions appealed to the party through the bureaucracy.
This appeal implied a form of ideological conflict within the party
which resulted in the creation of ever encircling boundaries around the
party. These boundaries were the specific, rational and hierarchical
character of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the implementation of NEP
came primarily through the channels of the bureaucracy. During the
development and implementation of NEP, the bureaucracy became a mechani-
cal expression of an already formal will, rather than an organic link
with the smychka . I consider this an intraparty contradiction, or the
party/bureaucracy contradiction, since it involves contradictory relations
within the party. It does, however, relate to the smychka since it is
the superstructural manifestation of this contradictory relation. Thus,
the structural contradiction between the peasantry and proletariat as
expressed in the will of the Bolshevik Party manifested in the super-
structure as a contradiction between the party and bureaucracy.
The central debate during NEP concerned the question of industri-
alization in the Soviet Union. The industrialization debates directly
affected the laboring men and women who would bring about industriali-
zation. In my opinion, Bukharin's alternative, usually associated with
the right in the party, was the only alternative which would have
achieved industrialization while preserving and enhancing the alliance
between the proletariat and peasantry. Bukharin's alternative failed,
however. It is therefore necessary to determine the reasons for this
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failure. One major reason which I present in this chapter is the party/
bureaucracy contradiction. In subsequent chapters, I argue that there
is a positive association between this contradiction and Bukharin's
positivism.
The Context for the Industrialization Debates During the Period of
New Economic Policy
When Lenin ended the period of War Communism in March of 1921
with the substitution of a tax in kind for the requisitioning of grain,
he inaugurated the period of New Economic Policy. This period was
essentially a relaxation of the coercive measures used during War
Communism when the Soviet Union was threatened with a host of problems,
not the least of which was the Civil War. Although not apparent at
the outset, the intention of NEP was a long range, gradual transition
to socialism. Peasant unrest in the countryside alarmed the Bolsheviks
into an explicit recognition that War Communism policies were failing.
NEP was the response to this mass disruption.
The effects of the October Revolution and War Communism finally
surfaced in the spring of 1921. The structure of agricultural production
had suffered during this period. "The effect of the revolution on
agriculture was profoundly reactionary" to the extent that "much of the
positive effects of the Stolypin reform" had been undone, making
"traditional strip cultivation" the prevailing mode of production in
the countryside. Under Stolypin, who was the Interior Minister from
1906-1913 under Tsar Alexander, many agricultural reforms were intro-
duced which allowed for greater production of agricultural products.
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These progressive reforms were nullified after the Revolution when the
peasants returned to traditional forms of production. During War
Communism, the Bolsheviks demanded and took from the peasants the neces-
sary grain to feed its army and industrial proletariat (who were
producing the necessary war machine). The peasantry reacted with hosti-
lity to this coercive policy. A familiar saying in the villages united
the otherwise parochial peasantry. "Long live the Bolsheviks, down with
the Communists!" You see, the Bolsheviks had won the Revolution which
returned their land, but the Communists represented the government which
took their grain. The peasants wouldn't tolerate the policies of War
Communism any longer. A new relationship with the peasantry had to be
found so that the already fragile base of Bolshevik rule could be
restored.
The existence of two cultures, one Bolshevik and revolutionary
and the other peasant and traditionally patriarchal and parochial,
defined the cultural makeup of the Soviet Union at the outset of NEP.
In fact, the peasantry had not been converted to socialist ideology.
It must not be forgotten that Soviet power in the villages
was weak, and that traditional peasant communal institutions
were in effective command.
3
The substance of these two varied cultures represents the submerged
crisis which emerged sporadically during NEP and finally exploded in
9its most heinous form with Stalin's "revolution from above."
The Kronstadt sailors rebellion shook Bolshevik power at its
roots. Kronstadt had been a bastion of Soviet influence during the
Revolution. But in the Spring of 1921, "the sailors rose to demand
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the fulfillment of the pledges of October: political freedom for all
socialist and anarchist parties, real elections to the Soviets, an end
to the oppression of the peasants." Caught by surprise, the Bolsheviks
crushed the rebellion. The rebellion delegitimized the Bolsheviks' claim
to power, and consequently the search for legitimized rule became a
primary goal.
The New Economic Policy inaugurated this search for a restoration
of the smychka between the proletariat and peasantry. Coercive policies
were proven wrong. The political and cultural tension between the
Bolsheviks and the peasants had to be relaxed before major structural
changes in agricultural production could be introduced. These struc-
tural changes were a primary aspect of the industrialization debates.
In this sense then, the debates were as much about achieving hegemony in
the countryside as they were about the reform of agricultural production.
The Bolsheviks debated this issue within the party. They carried it out
through the bureaucracy. In the process, however, they overlooked the
growing machinations of the bureaucracy. Emerging from the devastating
Civil War, "Bolshevism acquired a social basis it did not want and did
not immediately recognize: the bureaucracy." No longer representa-
tive of the popular will of the two classes they claimed to represent,
the Bolsheviks clung desperately to the only solid social structure to
emerge unblemished after the war. The ephemeral features of bureaucracy
and party stood in inimical contrast to the ubiquity of bureaucracy at
the outset of NEP.
The importance of delineating the nature of this bureaucracy
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becomes crucial in understanding the development of the revolution
during NEP. Stalin's capacity to overcome rivals, especially in 1929,
was not due entirely to his portentous manipulations of positions within
various institutional structures of the Soviet Union, although this
12
played a significant role in his final triumph. Cohen notes the
importance of the social-psychological factor in Stalin's triumph.
Bureaucracy contains its own rules of justification-rationality. When
an individual justifies behavior based solely upon rationality, leaving
aside the implicit moral questions involved in human behavior, they
develop a sense of cynicism which may easily be translated into a form of
elitism. In my opinion, this is the basic emotion Stalin relied upon in
his triumph.
The differentiation between the proletariat and the peasantry was
linked entirely through the formal will of the party. Relations between
this will and the smychka were conducted through the bureaucracy. The
party represented a potential organic link to unify the contradiction
within the alliance. Qualitatively, it could imbue ideological and cul-
tural consciousness to its newcomers, while at the same time it had to
grow quantitatively. From March of 1917 to the fall of 1928, the party
expanded from twenty thousand to one million, with sporadic purges and
14periods of growth in between. As the party grew in form, its substance
became something different. As Lewin states:
The newcomers entered a party which was not engaged any-
more in fighting tsarism, as the founders were. They didn't
share the values and the motivation, the culture and sophis-
tication of the old guard. ^
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Thus, the substance of the party had become a mere quantity, a mechanism
losing all trace of organic growth. While the bureaucracy also grew
quantitatively, its qualitative features exemplified a "petty-bourgeois
mentality", "philistinism", and the usual invidious characteristics of
bureaucracy
—
power, privilege and status.
While the base of the Bolshevik Party was firmly ensconced within
the bureaucracy, the struggle for unity exacerbated the contradiction
within the smychka . As the party grew, it resembled bureaucracy to a
greater extent. As the bureaucracy grew, it increasingly performed the
function of policing the party. Establishing organic links with the
smychka became a viscious mechanism for increasing the distance between
the Bolsheviks and the proletarian/peasantry alliance. The industriali-
zation debates conducted in this context became a virulent source of
ideological couflict within the party. Attempting to maintain the crisis,
the Bolsheviks precluded any attempt to establish organic links with the
symchka . A structural contradiction had manifested in the form of the
party/bureaucracy contradiction.
Lenin confronted these problems with sublime frankness in one of
his final works: "On Co-operation."
Two main tasks confront us, which constitute the epoch
—
to reorganize our machinery of state, which is utterly use-
less, and which we took over in its entirety from the preceeding
epoch; during the past five years of struggle we did not, and
could not drastically reorganize it. Our second task is edu-
cational work among the peasants, And the economic object of
this educational work among the peasants is to organize the
latter in co-operative societies. If the whole of the
peasantry had been organized in co-operatives, we would by now
have been standing with both feet on the soil of socialism.
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But the organization of the entire peasantry in co-operative
societies presupposes a standard of culture among the peasants
(precisely among the peasants as the overwhelming mass) that
cannot, in fact, be achieved without a cultural revolution. 17
Lenin could not have been more candid in his assessment of the correct
praxis for the Bolsheviks in the epoch of NEP. Two things must be done,
and they must be done simultaneously. Educating the peasntry would
transform traditional agriculture into cooperatives and thereby establish
peasant control over socialist production. Explicitly this means a
radical transformation of state machinery, and implicitly it means a solu-
tion to the contradiction within the gymchka . He states further:
This cultural revolution would now suffice to make our
country a completely socialist country; but it presents
immense difficulties of a purely cultural (for we are
illiterate) and material character (for to be cultured we
must achieve a certain development of the material means of
production, must have a certain material base) . a
It was now apparent to Lenin that the epoch of NEP was long term
and the tasks were primarily cultural. This legacy was left for the
Bolsheviks upon Lenin's death in 1924. It sparked the industrialization
debates and haunted the debaters in the years to come. The question
remained, though, as to who could most adequately fulfill this legacy.
Who, among the Bolsheviks, could correctly interpret this legacy and put
it into praxis?
Bukharin's Leadership Praxis and the Political-Economy of the
New Economic Policv
The most salient feature of the Soviet Union's economy during NEP
was its dual nature: a small socialized sector of large scale industry
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and an "overwhelmingly private agriculture, plus legalized private trade
19
and small-scale private manufacturing." In all economic categories,
manufacturing, transportation, agricultural harvest, etc., the levels of
production were below those of the pre-war era. In 1922-23, 76% of
20
retail trade was in private hands. On the whole, NEP was a period of
economic restabilization in which the productive forces of the economy
inched slowly towards pre-war levels.
The proletarian/peasantry alliance characterized productive
relations during NEP. The smychka was a cooperative relation blurred
only by differentiation in the peasantry classes and the petty-bourgeoisie.
It was essentially an exchange market infused with proletarian mass pro-
duction of consumer goods, peasant production of grains, and artisan
production of small goods. It was a mutually beneficial exchange system,
i.e. the proletariat relied upon the peasantry for the production of food
and the peasantry likewise relied upon the proletariat for the production
of necessary consumer goods. The petty-bourgeois producer stimulated the
market, while at the same time helped "meet the needs of industrialization"
by "means of taxes and the price system" imposed by the state. On
the whole, productive relations during NEP characterized an attempt to
restablilize the declasse proletariat and organize the peasantry into
socialist cooperatives.
In 1923, the first indication of submerged crisis surfaced in
what is well known as the "scissors crisis." The relations between the
proletariat and the peasantry turned against the latter. Distortions
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in the economy resulted in "a rapid move in relative prices in a direction
22
unfavorable to the village.""" Nove locates six reasons for the distort-
ed economy: (1) "agricultural production recovered more rapidly than
industry", (2) goods and materials unloaded by state trusts created chaos,
(3) "state industry was inefficeint" making costs high, (4) distribution
was inefficient, (5) the government sought to purchase bread grain at low
prices, and (6) "the inflationary race" hurt the peasants because it took
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them longer to journey to town to purchase goods. As a result, the
peasants stopped purchasing industrial goods. Prices soared even higher
until October 1923, when "industrial prices were three times higher,
24
relative to agricultural prices, than they had been before the war."
Hence, the name scissors crisis refers to the fact that the more peasants
withdrew from the market, the higher the prices went. In 1924, "the rate
of growth of large-scale industry" declined as a result of the scissors
crisis. Compounding the problem of economic crisis was the emergence
of opposition within the party. Thus, the submerged crisis surfaced as
political-economic crisis.
At the height of the scissors crisis in October 1923, the left
opposition (Trotsky, his supporters, and "members of the former
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Democratic-Centralist opposition") issued the "Declaration of the 46."
It "raised two main issues: the economic situation and the party
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regime." - They felt that the party's inability to deal with economic
problems resulted from bureaucratization within the party. While
Preobrazhensky was presenting his theory of "primitive socialist
accumulation" as a solution to the economic dilemmas, Zinoviev and Kamenev
36
rallied behind Stalin in official opposition to the Declaration of the 46,
which culminated in "condemnation by the Thirteenth Party Conference in
January, 1924.
"
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The party/bureaucracy contradiction is apparent in this struggle.
While the party could not tolerate factions in the face of the legitimi-
zation crisis, it could neither afford the luxury of opening the debate
to wider circles within the party. This would have created a deeper
schism in their relationship with the smychka . Hence, the party establish-
ed boundaries within which they could maintain any internal struggles.
This process is evident in two related facts. First, Trotsky appealed
secretly to the upper echelons of the party in 1923, apparently as a
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"prelude to broader discussion of the issues." J Although his appeal
met with condemnation, it was soon opened up to the party, in which con-
cessions on party democracy were made. Second, the party moved to condemn
the opposition just a few months later at the Thirteenth Party Conference.
It had, in the process, allowed for a certain minimal debate, but in the
end the party had successfully established a boundary around itself to
maintain internal struggle. As NEP progressed, Stalin became aware of
these boundaries, and from his position as General Secretary of the
Communist Party, he actively restricted them.
When Preobrazhensky issued his solution in the form of "primitive
socialist accumulation," Bukharin reacted quickly and negatively.
Although he agreed with Preobrazhensky on the need to industrialize using
internal resources, Bukharin strongly objected to the methods which
30Preobrazhensky advocated. He suggested clamping down upon the peasantry
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as a way of extracting the surplus necessary for industrialization.
Buicharin criticized this method in political-economic terms. He argued
that this would alienate the peasantry and thus weaken the smychka . To
counter Preobrazhensky and the left, Bukharin argued that NEP characteri-
zed a dual economy, i.e. "relations between state industry and peasant
agriculture", and therefore any disturbance of this equilibrium could be
31devastating. Preobrazhensky viewed industrial development at the expense
of the peasantry, whereas, Bukharin viewed the former dependent upon the
development of the latter. Agricultural development was not merely com-
posed of increasing the harvest, but of fundamentally transforming the
methods used, Bukharin recognized the importance culture would play in
this transformation. He repeatedly argued this point in the 1920' s.
We must constantly keep in mind that our socialist
industrialization must differ from capitalist industrializa-
tion in that it is carried out by the proletariat , for the
goals of socialism
,
that its effect upon the peasant economy
is different and distinct in nature, that its "attitude"
toward agriculture generally is different and distinct.
Capitalism caused the debasement of agriculture. Socialist
industrialization is not a parasitic process in relation to
the countryside. .. but the means of its greatest transformation
and uplifting . 32
In practical terms, Bukharin saw the credit cooperative and the
market cooperative in the countryside as the means through which the
peasant could transform small peasant production into cooperative
production. Indeed, it represented a gradual process of change. But
more importantly, it relied upon voluntary participation. The peasant
would engage voluntarily in cooperative agriculture. Bukharin assumed
that a cultural transformation would accompany this voluntary association.
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His argument rested upon one major assumption. He assumed, and I think
correctly, that voluntary association depended upon an attitudinal change
in the peasantry. A peasant could identify cognitively with reasons for
joining a cooperative (for example, greater production, greater income),
but to voluntarily make the change requires an appreciation, a desire for
the cooperative. Appreciation and desire flow primarily from the heart
and not the mind. Thus, voluntary peasant association with the coopera-
tive movement required an attitudinal, much more than a cognitive change.
Bukharin continued to view industrialization from the perspective
of the peasant. According to his argument, the development of large
scale industry depended upon the development of agricultural cooperatives.
The long range implications of Bukharin 1 s praxis seem clear. As peasants
move gradually into cooperatives, they produce more. The more they pro-
duce, the more that is available for feeding their family and more surplus
with which to purchase commodities from the city. As well, there would
be more grain for the urban proletariat (a well fed work force can
produce more). In addition to this, there would be more available grain
to sell on the international market (this would bring in the necessary
capital for the development of large scale industry). As NEP progressed,
the formal will of the smychka would be transplanted by a solid organic
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will of a conscious peasantry in alliance with the proletariat.
A much larger context defined Bukharin' s perspective, however.
Again, politics entered the realm of theory in the debate over "socialism
in one country." Although Stalin first introduced the notion of
"socialism in one country," Bukharin as co-leader of the party developed
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the phrase in terms of the smychka . By the summer of 1926, Zinoviev and
Kamenev had joined Trotsky in opposition to Bukharin, Rykov, and Stalin.
The former group became a formal minority within the party at the
Fifteenth Party Congress. Their platform hinged upon the "impossibility
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of building a socialist society in a single country like Russia."
Vicious intrapraty fighting followed. As Medvedev points out, the pur-
pose was not to unite but to divide the party. In Medvedev' s opinion,
Stalin perceived the subtle implications of this intraparty fighting,
35
and from his position within the party, he actively encouraged it.
Concurrent with the resurgence of political crisis, the "goods
famine of 1925" challenged Bukharin' s praxis at its heart. As Cohen
points out:
Bukharin' s assumption that whetting peasant consumer
appetites and commercializing the peasant economy would
generate grain sufficient to feed the cities and support
industrialization obscured the inherent backwardness and
low productivity of Russian agriculture, the primitive,
fragmented nature of which had been worsened by the revolu-
tionary breaking up of large surplus-producing estates and
Kulak farms in 1917-18. 36
In 1925, "NEP reached its apogee" prompting Bukharin to re-examine his
praxis. Although he remained committed to "NEP forms and market
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mechanisms," "he recognized that the Soviet Economy was now facing a
transition from the 'period of restoration 1 to the 'period of recon-
39
struction'." rie now saw the need to increase heavy industry and to
build capital stock. To do this, however, the peasantry (especially the
Kulak class) had to supply a greater portion of their surplus to the
state. While remaining strongly committed to "voluntary association,"
40
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Bukharin gradually neared the program advocated by the left. Unfor-
nately, the bitter disputes of years past precluded immediate recognition
of the need for unification. Stalin's collectivization as a final
synthesis went far beyond the imaginations of both left and right.
In December 1927 and January 1928, the Soviet economy suffered an
acute shortage of grain. Measures taken against the Kulak to confiscate
grain anticipated the ruthless adventurism of the collectivization drive.
At the same time (November 1927) , Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled
from the party and in December 1927, at the "Fifteenth Party Congress,
Trotsky was expelled to Alma Ata. The astonishing correlation between
economic and political crisis is a recurrent theme during NEP. But
this time, the submerged crisis was partially taken care of by the
expulsion of Trotsky. Throughout 1928 and 1929, the grain shortage
worsened and party discussion revolved around the possibility of extra-
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ordinary measures against the peasantry as a solution. No sooner had
Trotsky been expelled than political crisis again emerged. Bukharin,
Rykov, and Tomskii opposed further grain confiscations. Anticipating
the logical extension of grain confiscation, i.e., terrorist collectivi-
zation, Bukharin "warned on 12 September 1928 in Pravda: "If it (the state)
takes too much upon itself, it is forced to create a colossal administrative
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apparatus."" Although Stalin, in his usually contemptuous and vulgar
style, ruthlessly criticized what he now labeled the 'right opposition'
at the Plenum of the Central Committee of 1929, "Bukharin 's group continued
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to defend its views." Stalin's solution to the submerged crisis came
in the form of an all-out violent collectivization drive of agriculture,
41
and the expulsion (and later, the outright murder) of dissenting voices
within the party. He justified this solution with his theory of increas-
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ing class conflict as socialism neared.
This final struggle within the party exemplified the party/
bureaucracy contradiction in clear form. On April 6, 1928, the
"Central Committee gathered in plenary session for the first time since
45
the Stalin-3ukharin coalition had begun to crack." While "the emergency
grain measures were defended as a success", the "excesses" were condemned
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and the plenum s resolutions favored Bukharin and the right. Stalin
had apparently suffered a defeat. As Cohen notes, though, this was
. 47
merely "an illusion." Stalin responded with alacrity. He immediately
reassigned party members to different posts and openly claimed that "we
.
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have internal enemies." Stalin insisted upon unanimous policy recommend-
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ations which were "in a Bukharinist spirit." Stalin's insidious move
gave the appearance of opening the party to reconciliation. However,
througn che vantage of his position as General Secretary of the Party,
he moved to further restrict the boundaries of party democracy. Bukharin
was all too aware of the situation. Bukharin complained that Stalin's
"tactics inside the Politburo.
.
.were evasive and deceitful, combining
empty concessions and false comraderie but designed "to make us appear to
be the splitters."" Bukharin continued his criticism of Stalin's
activity within the Politburo. In a conversation with Kamenev on July 11,
1928, Bukharin said:
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He [Stalin] is an unprincipled intriguer who subordinates
everything to the preservation of his own power. He changes
his theories depending on whom he wants to get rid of at the
moment. In the Politburo group of 'Seven', we argued with
him to the point of saying 'You lie!' 'You're talking nonsense! 1
and so on. He has made concessions now, so that later he can
cut our throats. ^^a
Within a brief period of time, Stalin had successfully gained the suffi-
cient bureaucratic forces "to oust and replace entrenched leaders loyal
or sympathetic to the Right, a process abetted by a decade of bureau-
cratic centralization and deference to orders from above."
Although Bukharin was the recognized party theoretician, he was
defeated by the organizational power of Stalin. Bukharin 's intellectual
influence can not be underestimated. As Cohen notes, "his writings had
been official doctrine for over a decade, educating "hundreds of thou-
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sands of people."" Bukharin' s strength was "outside the high party
53leadership and indeed outside the party itself." His strength derived
from the lower party apparatus and the popular will of the smychka .
Stalin's support, on the other hand, rested within the upper echelons of
the party hierarchy. Bukharin' s leadership role, however, helped create
Stalin's organizational power. Bukharin failed to appeal to those groups
where his real strength existed.
Bukharin' s tragedy, and the crux of his political
dilemma, lay in his unwillingness to appeal to this popular
sentiment. Where the general population was concerned, his
reluctance is simply explained. It derived from the Bolshevik
dogma that politics outside the party was illegitimate,
potentially if not actually counter revolutionary. This was
an outlook intensified by the fear, shared by majority and
opposition groups alike, that factional appeals to the popu-
lation might trigger a "third force" and the party's
destruction. -^
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Further complicating Bukharin's relationship with his support elements
was the fact that "the social groups thought to be most receptive to his
policies, notably peasants and technical specialists, were "petty
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bourgeois" and thus unseemly constituencies for a Bolshevik." Bukharin
did appeal, but to the wrong place. Much like Trotsky's opposition in
1923 and 1925, he appealed to the upper echelons of the party. In doing
this, Bukharin played into Stalin's hands, since the upper echelons of
the party was where Stalin had his strength. He helped Stalin narrow the
boundaries of party democracy. The fact that the party's membership had
swollen over the years so that it no longer represented "the politicized
vanguard of revolution but a mass organization of rigidly stratified
participation, privilege, and authority" further complicated the
i
56
struggle.
In my opinion, one major source for party atrophy during NEP was
the content of the education for new members. Since Bukharin was the
primary theoretican of the party, he was also the primary educator. Two
of Bukharin's publications stand out as introductory educational textbooks;
ABC ' s of Communism and Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology .
The positivist persuasion in these books is demanding for the newly intro-
duced communist. The question remains: How is the positivist content
of party education related to the party/bureaucracy contradiction? In
the remainder of the thesis, I examine this question.
On the whole, Bukharin's praxis in the 1920 's reflected a highly
voluntary approach, conditioned on the one hand by the dual economy of
the Soviet Union, and on the other hand by his theory of equilibrium.
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His voluntary approach may be noted in at least three forms: (1) his
political writings are a form of praxis in that the ideas he espoused
were concretized in specific programs, e.g. state taxation policies;
(2) he recognized, as did all Bolsheviks, that the state would play a
major role in helping reconstruct the economy during NEP—this is neither
brute economic determinism in which superstructural formations are merely
a passive reflection of the economy, nor idealistic and militant volun-
tarism in which such classic but regretable statements like, "There are
no fortresses which the Bolsheviks cannot storm" are made; and (3) his
attempt, through the above two forms, to convince the party of the
validity of agricultural cooperatives based upon the voluntary associa-
tion of the peasantry. In each case, Bukharin's praxis reflects the
legacy left by Lenin.
Those who charge that Bukharin reified the system at the expense
of the individual (and he did) have themselves fallen into a curious
mystification. They fail to see the connections between theory, praxis,
and reality. Some prefer only to discuss Bukharin's equilibrium theory
as it converges with the structural-functionalist theories of the West
(indeed it does, but that is not the critical point). The critical and
dialectical point of view is to see the concretization of theory in praxis
under specific structural limitations. Although some writers attempt
to carry the connections this far, they only see a direct and linear
relationship between theory and praxis. Since Bukharin's equilibrium
theory is essentially mechanistic, they argue that his praxis in the
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1920' s was mechanistic; hence this group converges with the orthodox
Stalinist school which fails to appreciate the perplexity of theory and
praxis and also fails to include the structural limitations in their
"mathematical equation." They mystify their critique by believing either
ideas or reality lead directly to specific policy and therefore each
school represents a 'vulgar' understanding of the dialectic. They, if
you will, vulgarly critique what they presume already vulgar. While
their mystification is a self-satisfying adventure into the realms of
bogus historical-sociological inquiry, they diverge little, although
they would vehemently deny it, from orthodox Stalinism and the various
sychophant offshoots thereof.
None of this is to argue that Bukharin's marxism is free from
critical examination. On the contrary, the various critiques of Bukharin
are in part correct. However, their criticisms are incorrect for three
reasons: first, critics view Bukharin's work only on the theoretical
level; second, they fail to logically assess his marxism; and third, they
fail to see the implications of his marxism. In a word, their error
consists chiefly in the failure to examine Bukharin's praxis. Thus far,
we have examined the concrete conditions of the Soviet Union during NEP
and Bukharin's praxis. We need, yet, to examine Bukharin's theory of
equilibrium. It is with this analysis that I fill in the gaps left by
other critics.
Bukharin's The ory o^Equilibrium
Bukharin's eminence as a leading theoretician was generally
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acknowledged within the Bolshevik Party. Despite Lenin's quip about
Bukharin's scholasticism and misunderstanding of the dialectic, he still
recognized him as the "favorite of the whole party." Lenin's astonishing
comment probably refers to (1) Bukharin's penchant for sociological theory
which Lenin detested, (2) their disagreement over praxis—most notably
during World War One, and over the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with
Germany, and (3) some minor theoretical disagreements about the nature
of the capitalist state. If Lenin found any of these problems to be so
overwhelming why did he completely welcome Bukharin's Imperialism and
World Economy ? After slightly over a year of imbittered debate (1915-
summer 1917) he completely converged with Bukharin on the nature of the
. . . 58imperialist state.
Shortly after Lenin inaugurated the New Economic Policy, Bukharin
59published Theory of Historical Materialism, A Manaul of Popular Sociology .
Although one can find his equilibrium theory in other works, Historical
Materialism focuses especially upon the notion of equilibrium in society.
Bukharin's equilibrium theory weds a mechanistic reading of
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marxism with sociological theory. On the one hand, the mechanistic
reading represents his attempt to overcome the sociological critique of
62
marxism which used an organismic model to explain society; *" on the other
hand, it relies heavily upon "Bogdanov's mechanistic interpretation of the
63dialectic." Furthermore, the popularization of mechanical equilibrium
models in the physical and biological sciences spread to the social
sciences. Bukharin found sociological theory to be "the most general
(abstract) of the social sciences," something which "explains the general
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laws of human evolution" and thus "serves as a method for history."
For Bukharin, "historical materialism was sociology."
Bukharin places a great deal of emphasis upon Marx's later works
such as Capital and A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy
,
and probably more emphasis upon Engels' popularization of Marx.
Althougn he demonstrates a fastidious knowledge of each of these works,
in Historical Materialism he is most concerned with the general sociolo-
gical question of the relationship between human action and social
structure. One of Marx's works which best reflects Bukharin' s systemi-
zation seems to be A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy .
In the introduction to that work, Marx states:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably
enter into definite relations, which are independent of their
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given
stage in the development of their material forces of production.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which
arises a legal and political superstructure and to which
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode
of production of material life conditions the general process
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the con-
sciousness of men that determines their existence, but their
social existence that determines their consciousness. At a
certain stage of development the material productive forces
of society come into conflict with the existing relations of
production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal
terms—with the property relations within the framework of
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development
of the productive forces these relations turn into their
fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The
changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to
the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In
studying such transformations it is always necessary to dis-
tinguish between the material transformation of the economic
conditions of production, which can be determined with the
precision of natural science, and the legal, political, reli-
gious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in
43
which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.
Just as one dees not judge an individual by what he thinks
about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transfor-
mation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this
consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of
material life, from the conflict existing between the social
forces of production and the relations of production. No
social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces
for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new
superior relations of production never replace older ones
before the material conditions for their existence have
matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind
thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able
to solve, since closer examination will always show that the
problem itself arises only when the material conditions for
its solution are already present or at least in the course of
formation. ^°
Unfortunately this quote has led to many distortions of Marx, caricatures
in both the bourgeois and socialist camps. Questions concerning social
structure and human action, objectivity and subjectivity are raised by
Marx in this introductory comment. Gramsci, for example, found a great
deal of his own interpretation of marxism in this quote. This suggests
that a variety of interpretations are possible, since, as we will see
shortly, Gramsci disagreed with Bukharin's interpretation. Sukharin
interprets Marx literally, especially the statement, "which can be
determined with the precision of the natural sciences." Bukharin makes
two mistakes in his literal interpretation. First, he assumes that the
same method used in the natural sciences, i.e. positivism, can be used
in the social sciences. Second, he assumes that this method can be used
to "measure" not only the economic conditions of production, but also the
cultural conditions of production. These mistakes are the roots of
Bukharin's positivism.
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Bukharin's equilibrium theory hinges upon two essential elements
of nature, i.e, the environment and human society. He distinguishes
between two forms of equilibrium: the external and the internal. While
the relationship between the environment and human society characterize
the external equilibrium, the whole of human society in relation to its
parts characterizes the internal equilibrium. They each manifest
contradictions.
Whether we like it or not, society lives within nature:
is therefore in one way or another in equilibrium with
nature. And the various parts of society, if the latter is
capable of surviving, are so adapted to each other as to en-
able them to exist side by side: capitalism, which included
both capitalists and workers, had a very long existence.""
however much we theoretically justify the hostility of classes in society,
Bukharin recognizes the reality of class struggle in its moments of
equilibrium. The determinate factor and primary causal contradiction
between these two equilibriums exists in the relation between the human
system and the environment, in the external equilibrium.
It is quite clear that the internal structure of the
S2/stem (its internal equilibrium) must change together with
the relation existing between the system and its environ-
ment. The latter relation is the decisive factor; for the
entire situation of the system, the fundamental forms of its
motion (decline, prosperity, or stagnation) are determined
by this relation only. 70
Thus, the intensity of class struggle is determined by the external -
equilibrium. Any critique of Bukharin's equilibrium theory should begin
here. Class struggle is not central in Bukharin's theory. It is depen-
dent upon or caused by the external equilibrium. Thus, class struggle
does not manifest in social structure but is caused by social structure.
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Equilibrium, in Bukharin's view however, remains dynamic.
Again we emphasize that the law of social equilibrium,
that includes antagonisms, contradictions, incompatibilities,
conflicts, struggles, and— this is particularly important
—
that it cannot dispense, under certain circumstances, with
catastrophies and revolutions, which are absolutely inevi-
table. Our Marxian theory is the revolutionary theory. 71
"Certain circumstances" for Bukharin are the external equilibrium and
what Marx referred to as "material conditions for its solution." The
inevitability of this "law of social equilibrium" is in Engels'
dialectic the unfolding of history and nature.
Human society must first produce if it is to exist. The pro-
duction of necessities brings human society into contact with "external
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nature." Production requires the laboring process making "nature...
73
the immediate object of labor." This "immediate contact" of
74
"abstraction of energy from nature is a material process."
The social relation between men which most clearly and
directly expresses this relation to nature is the relation
of work. 75
Thus, the external equilibrium between the environment and the system
manifests itself through work. Critically important to understanding
this linkage is that it is a dynamic equilibrium, i.e., a changing
relation of production and reproduction.
When human society adapts itself to its environment, it
also adapts the environment to itself, not only becoming
subject to the action of nature, as a material, but also
simultaneously transforming nature into a material for
human action. 76
Bukharin establishes the internal linkage in human society as the "bond
of labor."
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The bond of labor is the fundamental condition for the
possibility of an internal equilibrium in the system of
human society. 77
Presumably, he distinguishes between "relation of work" and "bond of
labor." However, he does not discuss this distinction at all, precisely
because he views each in objectivist terms. Marx recognized the distinc-
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tion when he characterized the former as "sensuous human nature" and
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the latter as conscious and creative activity.
Bukharin defines society as "the broadest system of mutually
interacting persons, embracing all their permanent mutual interactions,
80
and based upon their labor relations." The content of the linkage be-
tween society and the environment, Bukharin aruges, is "the system of
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social instruments of labor, i.e., the technology of a certain society."
Furthermore, it represents "a precise material indicator of the relation
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between society and nature." Since production determines consumption,
distribution, and reproduction, any disturbance in the external equili-
brium must be located in production. 3ukharin establishes three forms of
external equilibrium: (1) stable equilibrium in which replacement pro-
ceeds smoothly, (2) unstable equilibrium with positive indication in which
productive forces are increasing, and (3) unstable equilibrium with nega-
tive indication in which productive forces are declining. Thus, in the
latter two forms of equilibrium, quantitative fluxuation leads to quali-
tative changes in the system. Revolutionary changes occur in these
periods of crisis.
Wherever a society exists, there must be a certain
equilibrium between its technology and its economy, i.e.,
between the totality of its instruments of labor and its
working organization, between its material productive devices
and its material human labor system. ^
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On the whole, the base in society is characterized as "the totality of
the production relations. .. the economic structure of society, or its
mode of production."
Bukharin defines the superstructure as "any type of social
phenomenon erected on the economic base" including the social and poli-
tical system (state, parties, etc.), and the manners, customs, morals,
religions, philosophies, language and thought. Societal norms
represent "conditions of equilibrium for holding together the internal
86
contradictions of human social systems." Norms, therefore, correspond
to the "bond of labor" and function to mediate class struggle.
Therefore, if society as a whole is to endure, there must
exist within it a certain condition of equilibrium (though
it be unstable) between the material work, as a whole and the
supers tructural work as a whole. °^
Sukharin's theoretical statement, here resembles Lenin's statement of
praxis in his article "On Cooperation." His theoretical orientation un-
doubtedly influenced Lenin's viewpoint, especially during NEP. However,
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Bukharin' s economic determinism is not repeated in Lenin's work.
Bukharin incorrectly imputes a general formula of society to ail hitherto
existing societies. He fails to grasp the historicist character of
marxism. This form of positivism universalizes history.
Bukharin distinguishes between two forms of dynamic internal
equilibrium. The first is evolutionary in that "a gradual adaption of
39
the various elements in the social whole" occurs. The second is
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revolutionary in that a "violent upheaval" occurs. While the cause of
the latter form of equilibrium "is the conflict between the productive
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forces and Che productive relations", Bukharin cautiously notes that not
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all conflicts of this form result in revolution. He states:
Therefore: the cause of revolutions is the conflict
between the productive forces and the productive relations,
as solidified in the political organization of the ruling
class. These production relations are so emphatic a brake
on the evolution of the productive forces that they simply
must be broken up if society is to continue to develop. If
they cannot be burst asunder, they will prevent and stifle
the unfolding of the productive forces, and the entire
society will become stagnant or retrogressive, i.e., it will
enter upon a period of decay. "
Several questions come to mind concerning Bukharin's statement
here, especially in light of our considerations of NEP and Stalin's
"revolution from above." First, though, lets put this statement in the
context of NEP. During NEP, productive forces were characterized by
state owned, large scale industry, and small entrepreneurial industry,
as well as peasant owned agricultural production. Productive relations
were characterized by supposedly mutually beneficial commodity exchange
relations between the peasantry and the proletariat. These relations
made up the smychka "as solidified in the political organization of the
ruling class." According to Bukharin's theory, the smychka was such an
"emphatic brake on the evolution of the productive forces" that it had to
be burst asunder or decay would have resulted. To say that Stalin's
collectivization drive "burst asunder" the smychka is putting it mildly.
Indeed, he pulverized the smychka
,
in the belief that this would aid
greatly in the development of the productive forces. Bukharin's theory,
apparently, vindicates Stalin's "revolution from above."
We know, however, that Bukharin stood firm in his opposition to
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Stalin's collectivization. How can we explain Bukharin's opposition in
light of his apparent theoretical justification? Why does his particular
theoretical orientation lend itself so easily to a vindication of Stalin?
The explanation, in my opinion, must be located in Bukharin's
theoretical orientation. Bukharin views the political superstructure as
a mere reflection of the economic structure. As such, political activity
has little autonomy outside that which can be identified as determined by
the economy. Bukharin fails to appreciate those forms of political
behavior which act upon, and indeed determine, the economy. This
error is related to a more general mistake in Bukharin's theoretical
view. Since political behavior is determined, then human action is really
external to development. Bukharin's emphasis upon the external equili-
brium negates the dialectic: praxis has no place in his theory. On the
whole, Bukharin's theoretical error boils down to his failure to view
class struggle as central in the historical process.
This general point, however, relates soley to his theoretical
views and not his praxis during NEP. We know his praxis was highly
voluntary, and although he appealed to the wrong place in his struggle
with Stalin, he did nonetheless appeal. If Bukharin would have chosen to
simply adhere to the dictates of his general theoretical views he would
have passively contemplated Stalin's onslaught. Since he actively
struggled with Stalin, we must determine why. It is my opinion that we
should not interpret Bukharin in such a literal fashion. Again, praxis
is not a unilinear equation, but the ongoing struggle. If Bukharin did
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not recognize this point theoretically, he at least behaved as if he did.
This mistaken literal interpretation of Bukharin's views has led to three
otner erroneous critiques.
The first and most apparent critique of Bukharin is that his
emphasis upon social structure leads ultimately to a capitualation
before the forces that be. If this were so, then why did Bukharin in
The Economics of the Transition Period , which contained the same
equilibrium theory and emphasis upon social structure as Historical
Materialism
,
advocate the ethos of war communist voluntarism? The
Economics of the Transition Period was published in 1920 during the
period of War Communism. In it he justifies War Communism, whereas in
Historical Materialism the most notable feature is the absence of
voluntarism. Cohen explains the difference in this manner.
...the dissimilar tempers of The Economics and Historical
Materialism
,
an almost quietest tract by comparison, derived
in part from the fact that they focused on different periods
in society's life: the first protrayed a transitory state of
revolutionary disequilibrium, the second the more usual state
of equilibriated society. And it is here, in his discussion of
equilibriated society, that Bukharin revealed an awareness that
any stable, growing society must be a cohesively integrated
aggregate, with at least a minimal harmony of its components . 93
The second and related critique is that Bukharin's equilibrium theory
led him to advocate gradualism in the 1920' s. While both critiques come
from the Stalinist sychophants, the latter was used most frequently
against Bukharin. It has two related elements: (1) guilt by association
and (2) equilibrium precluded qualitative transformation. In each, the
Stalinists associate Bukharin with the right wing of the party. What
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this critique ignores is the fact that Trotsky was a mechanistic philo-
sopher and Preobrazhensky used equilibrium theory. Yet both these men
94
are associated with the left wing of the party.
The third critique of Bukharin argues that he was really an
anarchist rather than a marxist. While it is true that Bukharin expressed
great fear in the development of the imperialist state, what he called
the "Leviathan" monster, this should not be construed as anarchism. He
did argue that the "first and primary objective of a proletarian revolu-
tion should be to assail and totally destroy—in his words, "to explode"
or "blow up"—the bourgeois state." J Bukharin' s theoretical views on
the state became a "constituent part of orthodox Bolshevik ideology" with
96
the publication of Lenin's State and Revolution . In light of Lenin's
legacy, Bukharin' s views remain vindicated, especially if we consider
(1) the historical tradition of state over society in the Soviet Union
97
and, (2) Stalin's anti-marxist use of the state.
The proper critique of Bukharin' s marxism should account for the
failure of his praxis during NEP. Cohen notes Bukharin' s support in the
lower echelons of the party and outside the party itself. Cohen ralates
further that Bukharin failed to appeal to these bases of support in his
struggle with Stalin. Why? Apparently, Bolshevik political culture dis-
dained politics outside the party on the one hand, and condescended the
lower echelons of the party because they were unseemly constituencies for
a Bolshevik, on the other hand. For an explanation of why Bukharin didn't
appeal to the authentic bases of his support, Cohen's argument is well
taken. For an explanation of why Bukharin did appeal to the upper
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echelons of the party (where Stalin had his strength), Cohen's argument
compliments mine. Cohen argues:
but the defeat of Bukharin and his allies was due also to
their refusal to carry the struggle beyond these councils,
where Stalin's power was greatest, to the larger arenas of
their own support. They refused partly because they them-
selves had helped to traduce, and finally expel, the left for
these same acts of public "factionalism" and "splitting."
Having created a narrow covert politics at the top, they were
trapped where Stalin excelled. And there, as even disgruntled
Stalinists later complained, they were defeated "not with
argument but with party cards," and "strangled behind the
back of the party. "98
The validity of my argument depends upon the concept, party/bureaucracy
contradition. This contradiction is a superstructural manifestation of
the structural contradiction within the smychka . Bukharin' s praxis
failed during NEP precisely to the extent that Stalin successfully de-
fined, and confined, legitimate party activity within the upper echelons
of the party. In addition, the left helped define those boundaries with
their struggles in 1923 and 1926. By the time Bukharin' s split with
Stalin had become inexorably apparent, legitimate intraparty struggle was
defined by tradition and confined by Stalin's conscious manipulations of
personalities with the party and bureaucracy. Bukharin' s cwn words
lend support for my argument.
The party and the state have completely merged—that is
the whole trouble. 99
In 1923-29, Bukharin had no where to turn but to the upper echelons of the
party. He played into Stalin's hand.
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The party/bureaucracy contradiction was not simply a manifestation
of a structural contradiction. A key point in my discussion of Marx's
theory of ideology was the dialectic between the concrete and the abstract.
Thus far, we have discussed the concrete, i.e. NEP and the smychka . We
have related NEP and the smychka to the party/bureaucracy contradiction.
We have, furthermore, discussed the abstract, i.e. Bukharin's Historical
Materialism . Up to this point, only clues of the relationship between
Bukharin's positivism and the party/bureaucracy contradiction have been
hinted at. Positivism, as an abstract entity , manifested in the form of
the party/bureaucracy contradiction during NEP.
This contradiction is, therefore, central in my argument. It was
the political manifestation of the concrete and the abstract during NEP.
As such, it was the political arena where ideology, culture, and practi-
cal programs were discussed and implemented. The party/bureaucracy
contradiction was the superstructural manifestation of the class struggle
as defined by the smychka and the ideology of positivism. In a word,
this contradiction was praxis during NEP.
In the next two chapters I explore this relationship in greater
depth. In Chapter IV, I present the context for the politics of positi-
vism and dialectics. That context includes the different family experi-
ences of Bukharin and Gramsci, as well as the different reactions each
man had to a similar European intellectual movement. I conclude Chapter
IV with a thorough examination of Gramsci' s critique of Bukharin's
marxism. In Chapter V, I examine Gramsci' s immanent critique of Bukharin's
praxis. This involves a detailed exploration of the relationship between
Bukharin's positivism and the party/bureaucracy contradiction.
CHAPTER IV
GRAMSCI'S CRITIQUE OF BUKHARIN'S MARXISM
The Adolescent: Years of Bukharin and Gramsci
Bukharin's Childhood . On September 27, 1888, Nikolai Ivanovich
Bukharin was born. He was Che second of three sons of Ivan Gavrilovich
and Liubov Ivanovna Bukharin, both of whom were primary school teachers.
From the time Nikolai was five until he was nine, his family lived in
Bessarabia where his father worked as a tax inspector. Other than this
brief period in young Nikolai's life, he lived in Moscow, Russia's
largest city.
Nikolai's parents provided a conducive home environment for the
precocious young boy. At the age of four and a half he could read and
write. His father, a mathematician who graduated from Moscow University,
"devoted himself to the boy's education, and was partly responsible for
his becoming one of the most intellectual and broadly educated of the
2
Bolshevik political leaders."" Nikolai developed three lifelong
interests under his father's influence. First, he loved natural history.
3
He himself described it as "the passion of my childhood. " His
"collection of birds and butterflies" and knowledge of the area impressed
Ivan Pavlov, "another amateur enthusiast" with whom Bukharin enjoyed a
4
warm friendship. Second, his passion for world literature set him
clearly apart from other Bolshevik leaders. Third, his deep appreciation
for world art became, in later life, an uncanny deftness in drawing
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political caricatures. At a very early age Bukharin internalized an
appreciation for the abstract qualities of life. Along with this came
an externalized personal security with the formulation of his own ideas.
After completing primary education with the highest of marks, "he
entered one of Moscow's best gymnasiums." He excelled in their
classical humanities program without, in his words, "exerting any
effort." Although the classics program was meant to instill an abiding
faith in traditional society it did just the opposite for Bukharin. The
school administration was often harsh and disciplinary. Bukharin became
a member of illegal student groups in the gymnasium. By the age of
sixteen, he "was already a leading member of the illegal student move-
ment associated with social democrats." The next year, 1906, he became
an official member of the Bolshevik Party.
In the fall of 1907, he entered Moscow University in the
economics division of the juridicial faculty. Despite his full time
commitment to illegal party activity, he remained enrolled at the univ-
ersity until his administrative dismissal in 1910. He spent little time
in the classroom.
By the time of his first arrest in May, 1909, Bukharin., at the
age of twenty, was the "ranking Bolshevik leader in Russia's largest
city." Arrested several times after that, he finally went into hiding
in the Autumn of 1910. Malinovskii, who was also a leading member of the
Bolshevik Party in Moscow, revealed Bukharin 's whereabouts to the
9Okrana. He, along with others in hiding were rounded up, imprisoned
and then exiled. Bukharin left Russia in 1911 and didn't return again
until May 1917.
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Gramsci's Childhood . Born fourth in the family of Francesco
Gramsci and Peppina Marcias on January 22, 1891, Antonio Gramsci spent
his youthful years on the island of Sardinia. Although Sardinia was
dominated by peasant agriculture and had for years been relegated a sub-
servient role in relation to mainland Italy, the Gramsci family lived a
petty bourgeois, yet rather humble existence. Francesco possessed a
"school leaving certificate," and was studying to be a lawyer when his
father died. Without the financial backing to continue his studies, he
took a job at the Registrar's office in Ghilarza, Sardinia. His mother's
family, native to Ghilarza, was petty bourgeois and Sardinian through
and through. Peppina, however, was "tall and graceful" and demonstrated
an affection for good books, even though she had only three years of
primary school education. She was different from other Sardinian girls.
Everything from her appearance to her tastes had a European flavor,
which for Francesco must have been a great relief from his uncommonly
bland existence in Ghilarza. The Gramsci's were Christian, but Peppina
was a somewhat more faithful churchgoer than Francesco.
Although his father was imprisoned for embezzlement when Gramsci
was very young, his mother stressed the importance of his education.
Despite the underdevelopment of Sardinia and his need to begin work at
the age of eleven to help supplement the family's income, Gramsci ex-
celled in school at Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia. An unfortunate
mishap occurred when young Nino was yet a babe. A serving-girl dropped
nim, causing a swelling on his back. This stunted (or at least the
family makes this claim) his growth and soon his already delicate frame
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became more precarious by his hunchback condition. While this prevented
the young Gramsci from joining in the rougher games children play, he
developed an acute interest in animals and books. He especially enjoyed
building little boats. This fact of life undoubtedly contributed to
Gramsci' s strong constitution and will, and his insistence of the same
in others in his later years. In 1911, Gramsci left for Turin, Italy to
attend the University in the faculty of Letters.
The Comparative Childhood . A comparative examination of each
man's childhood should partially account for how each came to marxism
and why they interpreted it differently. Two factors, the family and
the socio-geographical context, are important in this discussion.
Bukharin and Gramsci had similar, but different families. Both
families stressed the importance of education, but Nikolai's father
played an active role in his education, whereas, Nino's father wasn't
even present. Nino earned his education almost entirely through personal
effort with little encouragement other than that provided by his mother.
Nikolai's education came almost naturally, with little effort. Nino
struggled while Nikolai had the luxury of contemplation. Is it any
wonder, then, that Gramsci viewed marxism as a form of struggle and
Bukharin viewed it as a system of thought? Gramsci rarely spoke of his
father in later life, and held him responsible for the excruciating
burdens he suffered as a child. Bukharin, throughout his life, regarded
his father with love and admiration. Because of his father's absence,
Gramsci had to work at a very young age. He felt oppression in the
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workplace. Grarasci came to some form of hatred for oppression through
his personal working experiences. Bukharin, on the other hand, was
well provided for. Although he felt the oppression of the autocratic
administration of the gymnasium, he intellectualized this oppression.
Both men became involved in revolutionary politics at a very
young age. Gramsci interpreted marxism as praxis — as a form of
historical struggle for a better life. Bukharin interpreted marxism
as a system of thought — as a sociological explanation of society.
Bukharin' s socialization occurred in the most industrialized city
of Russia. Familiar with the culture of the working class, Bukharin
felt at ease when amongst them. Gramsci 's socialization occurred in
the most backward, peasant villages of Sardinia. He was very much aware
of the peasant culture. These opposing socio-geographical backgrounds were
also reflected in the quality of the schools each boy attended. Bukharin
attended the best of schools with the best of facilities and staff in
Moscow. Although Gramsci attended the best school in Sardinia it was
ill-equipped and poorly staffed in comparison to the schools of Moscow.
In short, Bukharin had a cosmopolitan childhood; he was a Muscovite.
Gramsci 's childhood was filled with the cultural folkways of the
Sardinian peasant; he was a Sard.
Bukharin came easily to marxist thought with his international
background. It fit in rather well with his perspective from childhood.
he was "first attracted to the Marxist movement less by its political
11a
stance than by the "unusual logical harmony" of Marxist social theory."
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Throughout his life, Bukharin continued his appreciation for social
theory, especially European sociological theory.
Gramsci struggled with marxist thought in his early years. At
first Gramsci interpreted his oppression and his fellow Sardinians'
oppression in relation to mainland Italy. The mainland was at fault.
Independence from Italy was the answer. After in Turin for some time,
his perspective broadened. He saw the Sardinian peasants' oppression
and that of the Italian working class in relation to the capitalist
class. Revolution against the capitalist system was the answer. When
he finally adopted marxism as a world view, his interpretation had been
influenced by many factors including his Sardinian background and his child-
hood struggle against his physical handicap. These factors continued
to influence Gramsci' s marxism throughout his life.
Gramsci' s youthful experience on the island of Sardinia remained
with him. As a leader of the Communist Party in later years, he express-
ed profoundly the needs of cadre to identify with the lowest of the
proletariat. He grasped the importance of peasant unrest and their
unequal status in relation to the urban working class. He saw the acute
contradictions between urban and rural sectors of society. As a result,
he never equivocated on the need for unity between proletarian and
peasant. 3ukharin also stressed the importance of unity between the
proletariat and peasantry. However, he couldn't feel the needs of the
peasantry; he could intellectualize those needs and understand their
political implications, but he couldn't feel their emotions since this
culture was alien to him. Gramsci' s childhood, on the other hand, was
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seeped in the cultural ways of the backward peasant. He not only felt
their needs, but he expressed them in political as well as theoretical
terms.
The Intellectual Context
The major intellectual currents predominant throughout Europe
were omnipresent in Italy as well. Gramsci found this stimulation most
exciting at Turin University. Three forms of thought, each but a part
of the larger German philosophic tradition, came to dominate the Italian
intellectual scene. They were marxism, positivism and mechanism, and
idealism. The problem here is to determine to what extent these in-
fluenced Gramsci. Bukharin's reaction to a similar intellectual miliue
was adherence to a positivistic and mechanistic marxism. Each man had
to contend with these various forms of thought, some of which included
explicit critiques of marxism. In some cases, Bukharin confronted
critiques of marxism with a straightforward critique (this is especially
the case with che Austrian theory of marginal utility). In other cases,
Bukharin simply incorporated new social theory into marxism (this is
especially the case with sociology). Gramsci's reaction, on the other
hand, was altogether different. Gramsci became one of three so called
"Hegelian marxists" after the failure of the Second International and
12
the failure of revolution following World War One.
The objectivism of the Second International became the marxist
revolutionary project in Europe in the late 19th and 20th century. Two
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opposing forms of revisionism, though born of the same mold, emerged in
Europe. In France, Sorel's syndicalism with its contempt for democracy
interpreted marxism as symbolic groupings and myths. In Germany,
Bernstein's evolutionism withdrew from marxist revolutionary tradition
and submitted to the forms of bureaucratic and parliamentary legality of
the bourgeois state.
Sorel's influence upon Gramsci has not been thoroughly examined
as yet. Williams suggests that Gramsci was influenced by Sorel "at
13
first deeply and directly" but "later more subtly." The first
impressions are unquestionable, Gramsci' s appreciation for "Sorelian
14historical intuition" is found openly in the pages of L
'_
Ordine Nuovo .
Despite Gramsci' s apparent disgust for Sorel's subordination to Croce,
the Sorelian influence in later years became more general and subtle.
Sorel was one of many European thinkers of the time with a healthy
skepticism of scientism, positivism and mechanism. Bergson, for example,
was concerned with the psychology of the unconscious. He argued that
when one's conscience guides actions, then and only then can one be con-
sidered free. However, this is rare because of external forces. This
Bergsonian argument easily lends itself to a social action program. A
social action program demands conscious participants. Individuals, who
are willing to submerge their personal will into a larger, more global
will, are considered free in Bergson' s analysis. Horowitz maintains that
"the essential problem for both Sorel and Bergson" was "what enables men
to act." By the time Gramsci was earnestly reading Marx, his thinking
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was colored along these lines. These Frenchmen formed a part of a more
general movement against vulgar materialism. Vulgar materialism precluded
a social action program since one of its fundamental tenets was that
human beings were nothing more than passive contemplators of an inevitable
historical process. In a time when Europeans felt on the verge of
greatness (prior to W.W.I), vulgar materialism seemed all too blunt for
the passion and creativity of human kind. Precisely this general
European movement was to have a profound impact upon Gramsci's intellec-
tual development.
In Italy, the Second International took form in the Italian
Socialist Party. Organized in 1392 by Filippe Turati, PSI reflected the
objectivism of the marxist project throughout Europe, The backdrop to
this organizational formation of objectivism is found in Achille Loria's
eclectic marxism of the 1870* s. Other budding examples of puerile
marxists may be found in the pronouncements of Saverio Merlino and Carlos
Ferraris.
Their theories combined Spencerian evolutionary history,
rigid economic determinism, and an abiding faith in a posi-
tivisc science which would reveal the laws of history. No
space was given in this tidy world for human creativity or
spontaneity.
^
/
Eclecticism of this sort disgusted the Italian intellectual Antonio
Labriola. A man of quite persuasive means, Labriola saw "marxism as a
18
practical philosophy," and "historical materialism as a critical method."
Labriola' s emphasis upon practical philosophy is a recurrent theme in
Gramsci's thinking, albeit expunged of its mundaneness . Labriola re-
presents the intermediary in the transition from the puerility of Loria
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to the formation of PSI, and back again to the critical idealism of
Croce. As such, he is integral in the formation of Gramsci's thinking.
By 1890, however, with the general European reaction
against positivism and determinism, an anti-determinist
and "Hegelian" revolutionary version of Marx appeared in
Italy in competition with the older Marxism. The father
of this movement was Antonio Labriola.
.
.
*-9
On the whole, Labriola' s contribution is two-fold. First, in attracting
the young Croce to marxism, he helped clear the way for a revitalized
form of revolutionary marxist project in Italy. Second, in mediating the
general European movement against determinism and the specific Italian
positivism of Loria, he helped create a suitable atmosphere for the
formation of the PSI» As Jacobitti notes, the early formulators of PSI
were "a curious mixture of Lorian positivism, Mazzinian anarchic senti-
mentality (often funnelled through the theories of Bukunin) , and
20
Labriola s revolutionary anti-determinism."
The sociological positivism of Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, and
Michels found willing expression in the works of the Italian sociologists,
Italians like Sergi, Sighele, Carli, Niciforo, and Pareto, further
inflamed the anti-determinist conscience of the freshly awakened Hegelian
marxism of Labriola and Croce. The Italian positivists were nothing more
than a specific expression of the general and traditional intellectual
groupings of European positivism. The critique of this positivism,
however, was never more thorough than simple ridicule and scorn. With-
out detailed and elaborate criticism, the anti-positivist intellectuals
ill-defined their enemy. In the wreckage left behind, Croce and
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Labriola had created a stirring among the young intellectuals of Italy.
Although this stirring failed to defeat the positivist movement, it re-
presented an important reawakening of the creative spirit in humankind.
In Italy, at least as much as in Germany, the period from
the 1390' s to the First World War was to rank as a literary
and philosophical renaissance. And this was to an extraordi-
nary extent the work of a single man - as Benedetto Croce
admitted without modesty when he came to write the history
21
of his own time.
So relates Hughes. He points out the rather loose frame of reference
the anti-positivists used to define positivism: "the whole tendency
to discuss human behavior in terms of analogies drawn from natural
22
science." He adds quickly that for Croce positivism was a philosophic
catch all, and that we can best understand the anti-positivist criticjue
if we view positivism "as a diffused intellectual tendency rather than
23
as a specific set of principles." Apparently, the anti-positivists
used positivism interchangeably with "materialsim," "mechanism" and
"naturalism." Mechanism is probably a most fitting description because
of the analogies drawn fron Newtonian physics. Whereas positivism in
the 18th century represented an ultra-intellectualist movement based
upon rational choices for human conduct, 19th century positivism degen-
erated into an anti-intellectualist movement convergent with Social
24
Darwinism. While the limitations of such an ill-defined scheme of
positivism are readily apparent, it is against this rather sketchy
intellectual scene that a revolutionary and Hegelian form of marxism
emerges in late 19th and early 20th century Italy.
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...since it had apparently been proved impossible to
arrive at any sure knowledge of human behavior - if one must
rely on flashes of subjective intuition or on the creation of
convenient fictions - then the mind had indeed been freed from
the bonds of positivism method: it was at liberty to specu-
late, to imagine, to create. 25
Labriola attracted the young Croce to his anti-determinist marxism
during the 1890' s. Croce was so impressed with Labriola' s work he
immediately immersed himself in the works of Karl Marx. Between
1895-1900 Croce delved into marxist thought and contributed some
enlightening comments on the subject, but he also found marxism lacking.
7 ft
By 1911, he was ready to declare "socialism is dead." Croce, there-
27
after, revered Hegel and "called himself a Hegelian. """ Croce was but
one critical thinker among many in the growing anti-positivist movement.
It was this intellectual terrain which defined Croce 's development.
An early reaction against Herbert Spencer and the positi-
vists left him with an abiding distaste for English empiricism,
and Mill's utilitarian defence of liberalism he repudiated as
fallacious and ignoble. 28
An abiding faith in human creativity and an indefatigable search for the
"rational in the real" defines best the Crocean character.
That Croce commanded the respect of Gramsci during his imprison-
ment should not alarm us. Indeed, Gramsci saw Croce "as a leader of
world culture. . .with the object of completing the task of revision,
29in order that revision may become liquidation."
To label another "revisionist" in the marxist sense is not
altogether a complimentary remark. Despite Gramsci' s 'competitive
disdain' for Croce, his admiration for the man, if not his mystical
idealism, certainly his immanent revitalization of marxism, is wholly
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visable in the Prison Notebooks . Germino points out that "with the ex-
ception of Marx himself, no other thinker was so important to Grarasci
for his own intellectual development." Jacobitti notes the importance
of Croce's thought upon Italian culture.
To Gramsci, Croce had been the greatest living philosopher
since Hegel and he felt that Croce's influence was so pre-
ponderant that if Italian Marxism was to survive it could only
do so if its ideas were recast in Crocean terms in just the
way that Marx had cast his ideas in Hegelian terms.
The revitalization of Italian national culture under the tutelage of
Croce contained the activist spirit so predominant in the anti-positivist
movement. Revitalizing the Italian intellectual conscience was alas
equally spiritual.
The noteworthy service rendered by idealism, and
especially Crocean idealism, to Marxism was to dispense with
any conception of reality as something external to man's
creative activity, as a kind of "mechanism functioning out-
side of man." Croce and the German idealists understood
that thought was creative, not merely "receptive"., but in
emphasizing the active power of the mind in ordering reality,
they ran the opposite danger of embracing an extreme sub-
jectivism, even solipsism, in which reality becomes confused
with the thought of the philosophers themselves . 32
Gramsci' s duty, of course, was to synthesize the subjectivism of Croce
with the objectivism of the Italian Socialist Party. The fact that
"Italian culture was moving from positivism to idealism under the
intellectual leadership of Benedetto Croce" is critically important to
understanding that Gramsci came to critique the positivistic and
deterministic encrustations of marxist thought "through the mediation of
Croce." 33
Gramsci' s interpretation of marxism rejected those elements which
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made marxism a so called "social science." He viewed it as an active
world force which could guide the masses in their struggle against
oppression. Bukharin, on the other hand, interpreted marxism as a
sociology. He viewed it as a system of thought which understood the
masses' oppression. As such, Bukharin' s interpretation was more con-
templative than Gramsci's dynamic, active interpretation. For Gramsci,
to act was to understand.
The Practical Life at Turin
The world of Turin's immense industry, especially the rapidly
growing automobile industry, confronted Gramsci with something altogether
different from the mundane simple life of Sardinia. The sharp contrast
of the sheepherder from Sardinia with the factory machine worker from
Turin was enough to propel Gramsci towards some form of critical
humanitarian philosophy. Gramsci's extreme poverty and ill health
became somewhat of a bond with the growing working class, which was
daily arriving from the Italian countryside. The boldness of Turin's
working class was something Gramsci and fellow students could not ignore.
Moreover, the swift rise of new firms, the crashes of
1907-8, the revival of prosperity from 1911 in a context of
general political militancy plunged Turin into struggles of
the fiercest intensity which made its working class a by-
word for solidarity and combativity. 34
In his early years at Turin University, Gramsci studied linguistics,
literature and philosophy. His socialism at this point was essentially
intellectualist with commitments to the popular Sardinian and southern
expression. He was "essentially 'Crocean', open to the whole world of
the mind, profoundly 'ethical-political' in motive."
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In 1913 Gramsci was drawn into the socialist movement. "Like all
the youth, he was Mussolinian in 1913-14; Sorel's style flits elusively
through much of his work." Although somewhat familiar with Marx, he
37
was not a marxist. He was, though, "repelled by positivism."
Williams points out that "what drove Gramsci in 1914-15 was an urge 'to
understand how culture developed, for revolutionary reasons... He wanted
to find out how thinking can lead to action... how thought can make
hands move.'" Gramsci' s voluntarism, at this point, was highly
Crocean. It was to remain central in his more articulated marxist
thought of the Prison Notebooks .
Gramsci began writing for the socialist newspaper, II Grido del
Popolo
,
in 1914. His first article, Active and Operative Neutrality
,
supported Mussolini's stand for intervention in the war and he was
thereafter labelled an interventionist. This label, along with the
fact that "his brother Mario volunteered for war service and ended up
39
a fascist," crushed Gramsci emotionally. He fell ill, withdrew from
the University of Turin as well as active party life, and finally
40
"collapsed into a nervous breakdown."
However, Gramsci re-entered the political life in 1916 when he
began publishing articles with the socialist newspaper Avanti! . Elected
secretary of the Socialist section of Turin in 1917, his commitment to
an active political life from this point forward never wavered. He
helped found the newspaper, L' Ordine Nuovo
,
in 1919 with its pointed
attention on the growth and development of factory councils in Italy.
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During the next two years Gramsci's presence involved everything from
virtual political isolation in the summer of 1920 with his communist
education group to intimate contact with the Italian popular masses
during the factory occupations just a few months later. The perfect
expression of these two extremes emerged in January 1921 when Gramsci
and Bordiga split from the PSI to form the Communist Party of Italy.
Elections in June 1921 ended Giolitti's premiership and brought
34 fascists to parliament. The growing crisis in Italy became even more
critical when the Bonomi government, in office just a little over six
months, fell to the rising tide of fascist inspired violence. The
remaining political vacuum left labor and socialists advocating the
restoration of order. Continued violence and general political-economic
havoc climaxed with the fascist march on Rome on October 28, 1922.
During this interim, Gramsci became a member of the Comintern
Executive as delegate cf the Communist Party of Italy. Again illness
41forced his withdrawal to a sanitorium.
In April 1924, Gramsci was elected to Parliament. He returned to
Italy in May of that year.
The fascist drive for total administration of Italian society
continued with Mussolini's restriction of legitimate political expression.
Mussolini's stranglehold of political and civil society culminated with
Gramsci's arrest on November 3, 1926. During the next two years Gramsci
was shuffled from one prison to another. In June 1928 he was convicted
42
of six different charges of treason." Although he was sentenced to
serve more than twenty years, he was released from the Quisisana clinic on
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April 21, 1937 and died just six days later from cerebral hemorrhage.
Gramsci's marxism developed in a very practical context as
compared to Bukharin. From 1911 to 1917, Bukharin's marxism matured
abroad. He spend much of his time in libraries. He had a good deal
of time for contemplation during his exile. Gramsci's marxism, however,
matured with an almost immediate necessity during the war and 'Bienno
Rosso' (the so-called Red Years immediately following the war).
Gramsci's writings about the Bolshevik Revolution reflect this dependence
on daily activity.
In 1917 Gramsci wrote an article on the Bolshevik Revolution
entitled "The Revolution Against Capital," in which he exclaimed, "This
is the revolution against Karl Marx's Capital . " He remarks further:
The Bolsheviks reject Karl Marx, and their explicit
actions and conquests bear witness that the canons of
historical materialism are not so rigid as might have been
and has been thought.
An yet there is a fatality even in these events, and if
the Bolsheviks reject some of the statements in Capital
,
they
do not reject its invigorating, immanent thought. These
people are not "Marxists", that is all; they have not used
the works of the Master to compile a rigid doctrine of dog-
matic utterances never to be questioned. They live Marxist
thought—that thought which represents the continuation of
German and Italian idealism, and which in the case of Marx ,
_
was contaminated by positivist and naturalist encrustrations.
The specificity of the Italian context is the post World War One crisis
of Italian imperialism. During this crisis the Italian communists
wrote with an open ended voluntarism. They felt the determinism of the
Second International prevented the spontaneous uprisings of the working
class from becoming a hegemonic force. Hence, the reference to marxism
as invigorating thought is to inspire the working class of Italy.
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Historically, of course, Gramsci was not all that correct in his
impressions of Russia in those early months of the revolution. As
Williams points out, Avanti! was misinformed on events in Russia during
the revolution. It wasn't until May 1917, when Balabanoff reached
Petrograd, that the Italians received any reports of the situation in
44
Russia, and even then their impressions were sketchy to say the least.
Williams states further that it was an "ignorant Gramsci" responding to
45October 1917; that his response was entirely Crocean. The immediate
affect though moved Avanti! further to the left.
Serrati's perception of Lenin at this point, like Gramsci' s,
was more visionary and mythical than correct, but it registered
a strengthening commitment to revolution. 46
Williams stresses that "what is striking about his (Gramsci) work at
least from 1917 onwards is its very close dependence on daily practice."
The fundamental difference in the maturing years of Bukharin
and Gramsci is structural. From their early socialization to the years
when their socialism matured, each man acted on a different stage.
Bukharin was more like a director in that he observed and contemplated
the world around him. Gramsci was more like the actor who struggled to
create the world around him. Even in their later years this seems to be
the case. Bukharin, after his dismissal from the Politburo in 1929,
remained a candidate member in the Central Committee. He still held
important posts after his fall from power. Gramsci, after his imprison-
ment, continued to struggle just to maintain his sanity. Imprisonment
did, however, remove him from che day-to-day struggles of socialism.
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During this time his ideas became more reflective and contemplative.
Gramsci wrote his critique of Bukharin during this contemplative period.
Gramsci' s Critique of Bukharin's Historical Materialism
While imprisoned at Turi, Gramsci wrote a series of critical notes
48
on Bukharin's Historical Materialism . These notes deal with material
ranging from Bukharin's theoretical views to his interpretation of art.
In each case, Gramsci finds fault with Bukharin's understanding of the
49
philosophy of praxis. Polemic best describes the overall thrust of the
critical notes.
Gramsci equates Bukharin's marxism with several pejorative phrases,
all of which are apparently interchangeable. In one place he identifies
Bukharin's marxism as the "metaphysics of matter", or more simply "vulgar
materialism"; in yet another, "mechanical materialism," "positivistic
Aristotelianism" , and "primitive infantilism". Gramsci argues that
the postulate which maintains "that every fluctuation of politics and
ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of
the structure" equals "primitive infantilism." According to Gramsci
this theoretical position has a three-fold problematic. First, one
can identify tendencies within a dynamic structure but not laws.
Politics in fact is at any given time the reflection of
the tendencies of development in the structure, but it is not
necessarily the case that these tendencies must be realized.
A structural phase can be concretely studied and analyzed only
after it has gone through its whole process of development,
and not during the process itself, except hypothetically and,
with the explicit provisio that one is dealing with hypotheses.'
Second, mechanical materialism "does not allow for the possibility of
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error by the leaders. It apparently assumes a unidimensional link
between structure and rational action. This theory dismisses the
possibility of human foibles. Third, political acts may be due more to
the internal necessities of an organizational structure than they are to
changes in the economic structure. On the whole, Gramsci's critique
fits well with the historic marxist critique. He weds an unflinching
polemic with the critical extension of Bukharin's logic. The result
is oftentimes a lucid sardonic tone.
Reading the Manual one has the impression of someone who
cannot sleep for the moonlight and who struggles to massacre
the fireflies in the belief that by so doing he will make the
brightness lessen or disappear, 55
Gramsci's wit is subtle interplay between polemic and logic.
The question arises as to why Gramsci devoted time to this
expression of "primitive infantilism." Gramsci condemns Bukharin's
selection of minor adversaries for criticism." He maintains that only
the great intellectuals of a particular philosophical tendency should
be chosen for critical analysis. Only in this way can one conduct
'serious' and 'scientific' elucidation of past philosophies.
This is connected precisely to a more general criterion of
method which is this: it is not very "scientific", or more
simply it is not very "serious", to choose to combat the
stupidest and most mediocre of one's opponents or even to
choose to combat the least essential and the most occasional
of their opinions and then to presume thereby to have "des-
troyed" "all" the enemy because one has destroyed a secondary
and incidental opinion of his or to have destroyed an ideology
or a doctrine because one has demonstrated the theoretical
inadequacy of its third-or fourth-rate champions. Further:
"one must be fair to one's enemies", in the sense that one
must make an effort to understand what they really meant to
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say and not maliciously stop short at the superficial immediate
meaning of their expressions. That is to say, if the end
proposed is that of raising the tone and intellectual level of
one's followers and not just the immediate aim of creating a
desert around oneself by all means possible. 57
If we direct this argument at Gramsci, it means that Gramsci must see
Bukharin as a great intellectual of a philosophical tendency. Gramsci
finds Bukharin "most representative" within the "vulgar materialist"
tendency. Why does Gramsci write his critique eight years after the
publication of Historical Materialism ? Two reasons are apparent.
First, Buknarin made his views on historical materialism international
with his presentation to the London Congress of the History of Science
CO
in June-July 1931. Gramsci feared the international influence of
Bukharin' s views. Second, Gramsci sought to define his views, for
purposes of the movement in Italy, in contradistinction to this vulgar
tendency within marxism. This tendency was, in essence, a relic from
the Second International. But it was contemporary and could therefore
have an immediate impact. Furthermore, Bukharin represented the USSR
in official status at the London Congress. When supported by a nation
state, philosophical views exert a far greater impact upon world
opinion than when espoused by individuals or disparate groups. Gramsci
continues this methodological point.
These are the opinions that must be refuted, in the person
of those of their theoretical exponents who are most represen-
tative and indeed worthy of respect for the high quality of
their thought and for their "disinteredness" in the immediate
term. Nor should this be done with the idea that one has
thereby destroyed the corresponding social element and social
force (which would be pure enlightenment rationalism) but
only with the idea of having contributed 1. to maintaining and
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strengthening among one's own side the spirit of distinction
and division; and 2. to preparing the ground to one's own
side to absorb and give life to an original doctrine of its
own, corresponding to its own conditions of life. 59
Gramsci obviously recognizes Bukharin as "most representative" of a
particular "social force." Gramsci' s very subtle point, however, is to
divorce himself from that "social force." Aware of Bukharin' s fall
from power, Gramsci struggled further to disassociate philosophy of
praxis from exactly that social force behind Bukharin' s fall. Although
no longer politically in power, Bukharin 's philosophical viex^s still
61dominated the outlook of the Communist Party of the Soviety Union. In
this subtle sense then, Gramsci locates in Bukharin a common disgust
with the social force, but identifies the major divisions between his and
Bukharin' s interpretation of the philosophy of praxis.
On the whole, Gramsci viewed Bukharin as a leader of a particular
philosophical tendency called vulgar materialism. His desire was to
disassociate himself from that tendency with the result of implicitly
denying the legality of the social force behind Bukharin' s fall, and of
preparing the framework for a social force essentially different in
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outlook from the USSR.
Two themes are central in his critique. They emerge not so much
in explicit form as they do in implicit substance. The first deals with
historiography which involves theoretical and epistomological questions.
The second deals with Weltanschauugen (world outlooks) which involves the
interplay between common sense, ideology, philosophy and human action.
Gramsci refers to the former as "the source of all the errors of the
Manual, and of its author" and to the latter as his "first mistake."
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I will examine "the source of all the errors" first.
The absence of any treatment of the dialectic could have
two origins. The first of these would be the fact that
philosophy of praxis is envisaged as split into two elements:
on the one hand a theory of history and politics conceived
as sociology - i.e. one that can be constructed according to
the methods of natural science (experimental in the crudest
positivist sense) ; and on the other hand a philosophy proper,
this being philosophical alias metaphysical or mechanical
(vulgar) materialism."^
Gramsci maintains that Bukharin turns the dialectic into "the level of a
sub-species of formal logic and elementary scholastics." Bukharin sub-
ordinates philosophy of praxis to traditional materialist categories.
He does not see the transcendent nature of philosophy of praxis and thus
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falls prey to old cultural forms.
The true fundamental function and significance of the
dialectic can only be grasped if the philosophy of praxis
is conceived as an integral and original philosophy which
opens up a new phase of history and a new phase in the de-
velopment of world thought. It does this to the extent that
it goes beyond both traditional idealism and traditional
materialism, philosophies which are expressions of past
societies, while retaining their vital elements. ^'
Gramsci argues the dialectic is a "doctrine of knowledge and the very
CO
marrow of historiography and the science of politics..." No other
statement by Gramsci concretizes so well the convergence of theory and
method in praxis. According to Gramsci, the philosophy of praxis
conquers the "history of modern thought" because it represents the
"concrete historicisation of philosophy and its identification with
69history. ' It cannot "coincide with any past system. .
.
(because) . .
.
identity of terms does not mean identity of concepts". For Gramsci,
the division of "the philosophy of praxis into two parts: a 'sociology'
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philosophy is the "source of all the errors of the Manual" and its
author.
The subsidiary questions involved in Gramsci's historicism are
theoretical and epistcmological. With each question Gramsci asserts
the autonomy and uniqueness of philosophy of praxis in relation to
previous philosophy.
Bukharin does not conceive theory in radically differentiated
fashion from past theory. He used theory as historically defined in the
bourgeois epoch, with the added twist of marxist language. He is there-
fore unable to grasp the novelty of marxist categories. Because
Bukharin fails to justify "that the true philosophy is philosophical
materialism and that the philosophy of praxis is purely a 'sociology',"
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he is unable to pose the question of theory with any exactitude. As
a result, there is "no clear and precise concept of what philosophy of
73praxis itself actually is."
Bukharin wishes to systematize marxism without resolving the
attendent theoretical and empirical questions involved in revolutionary
science. Gramsci writes:
A new science proves its efficacy and vitality when it
demonstrates that it is capable of confronting the great
champions of the tendencies opposed to it and when it either
resolves by its own means the vital questions which they have
posed or demonstrates, in peremptory fashion, that these
questions are false problems. ™
Bukharin mistakes science for system. He therefore overlooks the
necessity of elaborating the basic concepts of philosophy of praxis.
Gramsci maintains that marxism remains "at the stage of discussion,
polemic and elaboration."
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Why not therefore pose the question in its correct
theoretical and historical terms and rest content with a
book in which each of the essential problems of the doctrine
receives separate monographic treatment? This would be more
serious and more 'scientific'. But the vulgar contention is
that science must absolutely mean a 'system', and consequent-
ly systems of all sorts are built up which have only the
mechanical exteriority of a system and not its necessary
inherent coherence.""
Bukharin' s acritical acceptance of traditional philosophical categories
indicates his misunderstanding of the immanent structure of Marx's
terminology. Concerning the dialectic Gramsci notes:
It is well known , moreover , that the originator of the
philosophy of praxis (Marx) never called his own conception
materialist and that when writing about French materialism
he criticizes it and affirms that the critique ought to be
more exhaustive. Thus he never uses the formula "materialist
dialectic" , but calls it "rational" as opposed to "mystical"
which gives the term 'rational' a quite precise meaning.
^
/
Bukharin' s cheoretical orientation is best defined by early twentieth
century sociological theory on one hand, and an acritical acceptance of
78historical philosophical categories on the other hand. The former
merely expresses Bukharin' s manifest positivism, while the latter indi-
cates his latent universalism.
Bukharin' s failure in this respect does not allow him to pose
correctly the most primary question raised by the philosophy of praxis.
That is, "how does the historical movement arise on the structural
79base." As Gramsci notes, without resolving this question one cannot
proceed with the many attendent questions.
This is furthermore the crux of all the questions that have
arisen around the philosophy of praxis and without resolving
this one cannot resolve the corresponding problem about the
relationship between society and "nature", to which the Manual
30devotes a special chapter. *
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Since Bukharin neglects to cover this essential question, the remainder
of his views contain a faulty base. An architect cannot build a house
without first laying a sound foundation. Bukharin, in this case, raises
a superstructure upon thin air. As Gramsci puts it, the Popular Manual
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is "idealism upside down."
Human activity is central in Gramsci' s historicism. In Gramsci 's
epistomology , the human is the active agent in the scientific process,
while for Bukharin the human is the passive receptor of the world. This
is a foolish argument since no science would admit human inactivity in
the scientific process. What then confines the scientist in Bukharin T s
epistomological orientation? Gramsci argues an externally imposed
method traps the scientist; as a result the scientist is passive.
To think that one can advance the progress of a work of
scientific research by applying to it a standard method, chosen
because it has given good results in another field of research
to which it was naturally suited, is a strange delusion which
has little to do with science. 82
Bukharin' s systemization of marxism resembles science in form, but this
form is external and thus false and illusory.
The philosophy implicit in the Popular Manual could be
called a positivistic Aristotelianism, an adaptation of formal
logic to the methods of physical and natural science. The
historical dialectic is replaced by the law of causality and
the search for regularity, normality and uniformity . °3
Gramsci does not deny the importance of uniformity, rather the external
imposition of the positivist method upon that uniformity.
Naturally this does not mean that the search for 'laws'
or uniformity is not a useful and interesting pursuit or that
a treatise of immediate observations on the art of politics
does not have its purpose. ^
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As Gramsci observes, this external methodological imposition doesn't
admit two falacies of statistical laws. First, statistical laws can be
employed only so long as the masses of the population are inactive.
It should be observed that political action tends pre-
cisely to rouse the masses from passivity, in other words
to destroy the law of large numbers. So how can that law
be considered a sociology?°5
Second, statistical laws may result in improper political programs.
Furthermore the extension of statistics to the science
and art of politics can have very serious consequences to
the extent that it is adopted for working out future pers-
pectives and programmes of action. In the natural sciences
the worst that statistics can do is produce blunders and
irrelevances which can easily be corrected by further
research and which in any case simply make the individual
scientist who used the technique look a bit ridiculous. But
in the science and art of politics it can have literally
catastrophic results which do irreparable harm.°6
While Gramsci has little objection to the compilation of empirical
observations, he opposes making these observations a methodological
orientation.
The so-called laws of sociology which are assumed as
laws of causation (such-and-such a fact occurs because of
such-and-such a law, etc.) have no causal value: they are
almost always tautologies and paralogisms. Usually they
are no more than a duplicate of the observed fact itself."'
Gramsci asserts the centrality of human activity in the scientific
process. His whole argument rests upon the organic, historic human.
Objectivity is not something imposed by particular methodological
criteria, but something internal.
The idea of 'objective' in metaphysical materialism would
appear to mean an objectivity that exists even apart
from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist
even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically
or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality
only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming,
knowledge and reality are also becoming and so is objectivity,
etc. 88
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The scientist is an active agent in experimentation. Experimentation
becomes a new expression of humanity;, it is a new bond. This bond is
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the " cell of the new method of production." Hence, experimentation is
the embryonic formation of a new society.
Scientific experiment is the first cell of the new method
of production, of the new form of active union of man and
nature. The scientist-experimentor is also a worker, not a
pure thinker, and his thought is continually controlled by
practice and vice versa, until there is formed the perfect
unity of theory and practice. 90
Since only tendencies and not laws can be detected, prediction
becomes an act of the scientist rather than passive pretense.
Prediction reveals itself thus not as a scientific act of
knowledge, but as the abstract expression of the effort made,
the practical way of creating a collective will.
And how could prediction be an act of knowledge? One
knows what has been and what is, not what will be, which
is something 'non-existent' and therefore unknowable by
definition. yx
Gramsci destroys both the subjectivist and the objectivist positions on
the nature of knowledge and being. Again, he maintains that the human
is the internal mediator within time and space.
Objectivity always means "humanly objective" which can be
held to correspond exactly to 'historically subjective': in
other words, objective would mean universal subjective. Man
knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the
whole human race historically unified in a single unitary
cultural system. 92
In maintaining that the source of all the errors of the Manual is
the division of the philosophy of praxis into two—one a sociology, the
other metaphysical materialism—Gramsci makes two points. First,
Bukharin's systematic marxism becomes trapped by a positivist methodology
adopted mistakenly from the natural sciences. This leads ultimately to
a position which views the human being as external to historic process.
The intellectual origin for Bukharin's mistaken identification of
marxism with sociology is early twentieth century sociology. Second,
Bukharin confines his marxism within traditional philosophic categories.
Caught in historically defined language, Bukharin's marxism lapses
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ultimately into a form of metaphysical materialism.
Gramsci examines Bukharin's understanding of the concepts
quantity and quality to highlight his first point. Both Bukharin and
Gramsci agree in the abstract that society is more than the sum of its
parts. However, they disagree in the concrete. Bukharin uses the
mechanical analogy of the thermometer. Water at a certain temperature
exists quantitatively and qualitatively. As the temperature rises, the
nature of water changes until at a cercain point, say 100°C, it changes
form completely. Bukharin has made a point. However, Gramsci points
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out that it is a mechanical fact determined by external agents...
Gramsci locates the passage from quantity to quality in human action —
historically becoming.
In the case of man, who is this external agent? In the
factory it is the division of labor, etc., conditions created
by a man himself. In society it is the ensemble of produc-
tive forces. But the author of the Manual has not considered
that, if every social aggregate is something more (and different)
than the sum of its components, this must mean that the law
or principle which explains the development of society cannot
be a physical law, since in physics one does not get out of
the quantitative sphere except metaphorically .95
Bukharin's methodological orientation precludes the human actor from
center stage.
To highlight his second point Gramsci examines Bukharin's
understanding of matter. Bukharin understands matter in the natural
scientific sense, and not as a productive economic element. Using the
term in this way differs little from its use in metaphysical materialism.
Thus, Bukharin fails to grasp the significance of Marx's critique of old
materialism. Gramsci notes the marxian understanding of matter.
Matter as such therefore is not our subject but how it
is socially and historically organized for production, and
natural science should be seen correspondingly as essentially
an historical category, a human relation. 96
Matter is not simply objective. It is infused with the subjective
action of the human being. It thus becomes a dialectical relation and
a humanly dependent process.
In Chapter V, I examine Gramsci' s critique of Bukharin's
Weltanschaaug . Much of Gramsci' s marxism remains implicit in his
critique. Our objective is to make it explicit. Special attention will
be given to the link between positivism and the party/bureaucracy con-
tradiction, and the accompanying question of the Leninist party. Perhaps
it would be best to conclude Chapter IV and begin Chapter V with a
quote from Gramsci which links the historicist and leadership questions of
the philosophy of praxis.
To maintain that the philosophy of praxis is not a
completely autonomous and independent structure of thought
in antagonism to all traditional philosophies and religions,
means in reality that one has not severed one's links with
the old world, if indeed one has not actually capitulated. 9/
CHAPTER V
BUKHARIN'S POSITIVISM AND THE PARTY /BUREAUCRACY
CONTRADICTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRAXIS
Introduction
Five loose ends remain from Chapter IV. The first concerns
Gramsci's disassociation from the Soviet Union. I will discuss this
point under the general critique of the Leninist party, of which it
seems a part. The other four include Bukharin's Weltanschauung , the
psychological dimension of Bukharin's major error, his revisionism, and
the quality of his leadership. While I begin with the latter two, all
four are part of the link between Bukharin's positivism and the party/
bureaucracy contradiction.
For purposes of continuity I will restate the party/bureaucracy
contradiction. The conflict between private ownership of small industry
and agriculture on one hand, and of state ownership of capital industry
on the other hand determined the structure of NEP. Social relations
between the peasantry and the proletariat were held together precariously
by the party's capacity to effectively unite the two with mutually
beneficial commodity exchange. Equilibrium continually gave way to
various price fluctuations and grain shortages. The superstructural
manifestation of this contradiction emerged in the form of hegemonic
crisis. This crisis was submerged to the extent that it occurred
sporadically during NEP and finally exploded in 1929 with Stalin's
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"revolution from above." The hegemonic crisis consisted precisely in
the fact that the relations between the base of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the party itself had lost their organic character.
NEP became therefore the party's attempt to reestablish its organic link
with the proletarian/peasantry alliance ( smychka ) . Instead of becoming
more organic the party more and more began to resemble a machine. As
its quality declined, its quantity increased. The mechanical appendage
to this growth was the bureaucracy. It was this bureaucracy which
corralled the ensuing struggles between left and right in the party.
Indeed, the left and right appealed to this bureaucracy for judgment of
their respective programs. Judgment came, but it was a mechanically
imposed justice. Neither right nor left won in the nightmarish climax
to NEP. Stalin indeed had resolved the contradiction.
Thus far we have examined Gramsci's critique of Bukharin's
marxism in the abstract. Many other writers have done this, although
not as thoroughly. Their mistake is to leave it at that. My contri-
bution will be to extend this critique to Bukharin's praxis; hence, the
whole question of the relationship between Bukharin's positivism and the
party/bureaucracy contradiction. What are the concrete manifestations
of Bukharin's positivism? No other author has addressed this question.
Up to this point I have explicated Gramsci's critique. From this point
forward Gramsci's critique will be used to support my argument. This is
the sense in which I speak of Gramsci's immanent critique. My point is
this: Bukharin's positivism was manifested concretely in the party as a
mechanical net which both constrained the organic growth of the party
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and widened the parameters for its quantitative growth. This net was
the bureaucracy. Thus, Bukharin's positivism in the abstract became the
party/bureaucracy contradiction in the concrete.
Two forms of leadership require attention in our discussion.
First, there is the leadership within the party, or simply intraparty
leadership. As a party grows this form becomes more important. Two
sociohistorical factors contribute to continued organic growth of the
party. On the one hand, new members must be introduced with the same
or similar dynamic commitment to the party ideology as were the old
guard. On the other hand, local party cadre must maintain a cohesive
bond with both the local mass of which it is a representative and the
top echelons of the party of which it aspires to be. Both became
critical in time and space since the growth of the parcy indicates the
development of necessary party functions. More simply, as party
functions increase so do the number of party individuals who have well
defined roles. These well defined roles of course refer to bureaucracy.
Hence, it is very important that the bureaucracy is not a mechanical
addition but an organic part of the party as a whole.
Second, there is the leadership between the party and the mass,
or simply interparty leadership. As the mass becomes more consciously
active, this form becomes more important. While the mass conditions the
party to the extent that the party articulates the oftentimes incoherent
expressions of the movement, the party must elevate these spontaneous
stirrings of the mass to their historical cultural awareness. Two social
psychological factors contribute to the dialectical relation between
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mass and party. On the one hand, party leaders must not manipulate
the spontaneity of the mass for immediate party gain. Oftentimes this
is referred to as opportunism. The concrete manifestation of this error
is party reluctance to carry through with its cultural project, i.e., to
raise the consciousness of the mass to its sociohistorical capacity.
This mistake relies upon the gut level reaction of the mass and in no
way makes an effort to go beyond this spontaneous emotion. Indeed, it
plays up to it. On the other hand, party leaders must not impose their
coherent world view upon the mass without first understanding the
masses' spontaneous emotion. This emotion must first be made coherent.
Only then is an alternative world view a possibility. That is if we
wish the new world view to be a really organic part of an individual's
social psychological makeup. Anyone can have an artifically or mechani-
cally imposed world view. As interparty leadership develops, the
distinctions between party and mass become less apparent.
The duality of leadership expressed here has concrete substance in
the life of the mass itself. These forms are but mere expressions of
one whole. This whole is the new ruling group or hegemonic force. In
my opinion, this is the meaning of the following statement by Gramsci.
Thus, since every party is only a class nomenclature, it
is evident that for the party which sets itself to abolish
the division into classes, its perfection and completion
consists in no longer existing, since classes, and therefore
their expressions, no longer exist. -*-
Concerning the quality of Sukharin's leadership, I would like
to make two points. Since both points apply to inter and intraparty
leadership, I will not distinguish between the two. First, Bukharin is
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a revisionist rather than an orthodox marxist. Second, he is a tradi-
3
tionai rather than an organic intellectual.
Bukharin's revisionism consists precisely in the fact that he sub-
ordinates philosophy of praxis to "general (vulgar) materialist
4
philosophy. His leadership and praxis are thus confined by traditional
philosophical categories. Hence, his marxism represents a continuous,
uninterrupted flow of intellectual thought from the old to the new,
despite the apparent ideological disruptions with previous thought. This
accounts for the similarity between his "revolutionary" equilibrium
theory and the bourgeois "norm of reciprocity." As Gramsci points out,
orthodoxy refers to one's orientation within the philosophy of praxis.
Orthodoxy is not to be looked for in this or that adherent
of the philosophy of praxis, or in this or that tendency con-
nected with currents extraneous to the original doctrine, but
in the fundamental concept that the philosophy of praxis is
"sufficient unto itself", that it contains in itself all the
fundamental elements needed to construct a total and integral
conception of the world, a total philosophy and theory of
natural science, and not only that but everything that is
needed to give life co an integral practical organization of
society, that is, to become a total integral civilization. D
Notice that Gramsci does not state philosophy of praxis is such and
such — he does not say that it is a science — but rather that "it
contains in itself all the fundamental elements needed to construct...
to become a total integral civilization." Bukharin in a sense develops
these "fundamental elements" but he subordinates them to past philosophy.
He confines them to a falsely adopted methodological orientation. Thus,
Bukharin is not an orthodox marxist. Bukharin has not severed "links
with the old world." He maintains continuity with the past, and there-
fore he is a traditional intellectual.
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A closer inquiry into the quality of Bukharin's leadership
reveals the link between positivism and praxis. His ideological leader-
ship within the party is unquestioned. He exercised his intra and
interparty leadership in several ways. He was well published in various
party journals and official newspapers. After 1926, he was President
of Comintern. As the recognized party theoretician he published several
very important works; ABC's of Communism and Historical Materialism to
name but two. As a leader of the party which claimed its base in the
smychka
,
he had very organic ties with the proletariat, but lacked the
same with the peasantry. The latter two forms of leadership, i.e., as
theoretician and leader of smychka
,
concern us most. Inquiry into
these forms of leadership will reveal the link between positivism and
praxis.
Bukharin wrote Historical Materialism for circulation within the
party. As such, the intended audience included cadre who had accumulated
critical experience during the maturation of the revolution as well as
cadre who had been recently introduced into the party. The practical
impact of such a document is therefore two-fold: (1) it must embrace a
wide range of experience and critical knowledge; and (2) it must
consider the various levels of party membership, i.e., everything from
local cadre to the top echelons of the party. Both have interparty
implications since at every level of experience and membership, party
cadre deal with the mass. In a word, Bukharin had a profound impact
upon the development of intra and interparty leadership with the
publication of Historical Materialism. I will demonstrate, with the use
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of Gramsci's critique, that this impact tended towards an acritical and
mechanical acceptance of the objective world; a world well defined within
bureaucracy; a world defined by the party/bureaucracy contradiction.
Bukharin therefore contributed actively to the contradiction which
spelled his doom.
Gramsci's Immanent Critique
The second theme of Gramsci's critique deals with world outlook.,
which broken down involves common sense, ideology and philosophy, and
human action. The concrete manifestation of Bukharin's world outlook,
which as we pointed out above was subordinate to traditional materialist
philosophy and sociological positivism, results in an acritical
acceptance of the objective world. Bukharin does this in a contradictory
way. On one hand, he doesn't bother to critique common sense, and on
the other hand, he appeals to common sense. He ignores it, then lauds
it — all in a vain attempt to embellish philosophy of praxis.
Bukharin begins by opposing historical materialism to other great
philosophies, rather than with a critique of common sense. Gramsci
maintains that a popular work ought to begin with a critique of common
sense, since this is the average person's conception of the world.
A work like the Popular Manual
,
which is essentially des-
tined for a community of readers who are not professional
intellectuals, should have taken as its starting point a
critical analysis of the philosophy of common sense, which is
the "philosophy of non-philosophers," or in other words the
conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the
various social and cultural environments in which the moral
individuality of the average man is developed."
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Bukharin's first mistake is methodological. A critique of great
philosophical systems is certainly necessary, but only after the "chaotic
aggregate of disparate conceptions" of common sense is criticized.
The first mistake of the Popular Manual is that it starts,
at least implicitly, from the assumption that the elaboration
of an original philosophy of the popular masses is to be op-
posed to the great systems of traditional philosophy and the
religion of the leaders of the clergy—i.e., the conception of
the world of the intellectuals and high culture. In reality
these systems are unknown to the multitude and have no direct
influence on its way of thinking and acting."
Gramsci suggests the correct procedure for a popular work: (1) a
critique of common sense; (2) a polemic against traditional philosophy
and religion; and (3) an elaboration of the philosophy of praxis. Why
bother with common sense, since it does contain some truth?
What was said above does not mean that there are no truths
in common sense. It means rather that common sense is an
ambiguous, contradictory and multiform concept, and that to
refer to common sense as a confirmation of truth is a nonsense.
It is possible to state correctly that a certain truth has
become common sense in order to indicate that it has spread
beyond the confines of intellectual groups, but all one is
doing in that case is making a historical observation and an
assertion of the rationality of history.
°
Common sense has a formal solidity, a "consequent imperative character
(which) they have when they produce norms of behavior." Common sense
guides human action, ideology rationalizes it, and philosophy is the
intellectual endeavor of certain leaders within the ruling class. The
role of the intellectual within the newly emergent hegemonic force is
active confrontation with previous modes of conduct, i.e., common sense,
rather than passive reflection of past philosophy.
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In the teaching of philosophy which is aimed not at giving
the student historical information about the development of
past philosophy, but at giving him a cultural formation and
helping him to elaborate his own thought critically so as to
be able to participate in an ideological and cultural
community, it is necessary to take as one's starting point
what the student already knows and his philosophical experi-
ence (having first demonstrated to him precisely that he has
such an experience, that he is a "philosopher" without knowing
it) . And since one presupposes a certain average culture and
intellectual level among the students, who in all probability
have hitherto only acquired scattered and fragmentary bits of
information and have no methodological and critical preparation,
one cannot but start in the first place from common sense, then
secondly from religion, and only at a third stage move on to the
philosophical systems elaborated by traditional intellectual
groups. ^
Philosophy of praxis conceived in this manner is not an abstract entity.
It is an on-going struggle to overcome common sense; it is an embryo of
the new society. Gramsci asks:
Is it possible to write an elementary book, a handbook
a "Popular Manual" on a doctrine that is still at the stage
of discussion, polemic and elaboration? A popular manual
cannot be conceived other than as a formally dogmatic, styli-
stically poised and scientifically balanced exposition of a
particular subject. *2
Since the philosophy of praxis is a mass philosophy, it must always be
conceived in polemical form. It is not a system or science precisely
to the extent that it is still in the process of elaboration on the one
hand, and that it is an embryonic formation of the new society on the
other hand. In other words, it is necessarily incomplete as a system of
thought and society. Gramsci fears the Popular Manual because it both
ignores and reinforces common sense.
This, then, is a danger of the Popular Manual
,
which
often reinforces, instead of scientifically criticizing,
these acriticai elements which have caused common sense to
remain Ptolemaic, anthropomorphic, and anthropocentric-^3
This methodological error would appear to be a sociohistorical aspect of
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intraparty leadership. However, the distinctions between intra and
interparty leadership are not so apparent since the party at this point
is in the process of rapid growth and decline.
There is the social psychological aspect of interparty leadership.
According to Gramsci, the second origin for "the absence of any treat-
14
ment of the dialectic.
.
.would appear to be psychological."
It is felt that the dialectic is something arduous and
difficult, in so far as thinking dialectically goes against
vulgar common sense. ^
Bukharin is unable to deal properly with the dialectic because he
opposes it to something already considered foolish by the mass. Gramsci
offers the following example: if you introduced Einsteinian relativity
to school children who are still being taught the "law of nature" at
home, they would laugh. Similarly, the dialectic lacks all meaning to
the average person who bases his/her action upon what is known, most
common, i.e., common sense.
The popular public does not think that a problem such as
whether the external world exists objectively can even be
asked. One just has to enunciate the problem in these terms
to provoke an irresistable and gargantuan outburst of
laughter. 16
This question of course is legitimate philosophical inquiry but only
after some critical sense is made of common sense. To pose the question
outright is indeed laughable. Gramsci maintains that to both ignore and
reinforce common sense is reactionary.
Since all religions have taught and do teach that the world,
nature, the universe were created by God before the creation of
man, and therefore man found the world already made, catalogued
and defined once and for all, this belief has become an iron fact
of "common sense" and survives with the same solidity even if
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religious feeling is dead or asleep. It follows therefore
that to base oneself on this experience of common sense in
order to destroy the subjectivist conception by "poking fun"
at it has a rather "reactionary" significance, an implicit
return to religious feeling. 1?
Bukharin implicitly adopts a common sensical view. Yet he explicitly
ignores a critique of common sense. Again this would seem to lock
philosophy of praxis into a past orientation of reality. He attempts to
make philosophy of praxis common sense. A critical view of the subjecti-
vist conception is thus made impossible from the view of philosophy of
praxis.
The point that must be made against the Popular Manual
is that is has presented the subjectivist conception just as
it appears from the point of view of common sense criticism
and that it had adopted the conception of the objective
reality of the external world in its most trivial and uncri-
tical sense without so much as a suspicion that it can run .
ft
into objections on the grounds of mysticism, as indeed it has.
Overall, Bukharin makes theoretical and methodological mistakes
which result in an equally mistaken praxis.
This motivation seems to me to act as a psychological
brake on the author of the Manual ; he really does capitulate
before common sense and vulgar thought, since he has not put
the problem in exact theoretical terms and is therefore in
practice disarmed and impotent. 19
His theoretical error locks philosophy of praxis into traditional and
past philosophy. His methodological error results in an acritical
acceptance of the objective world.
The linkages established here between Bukharin' s positivism and
the party/bureaucracy contradiction seem apparent in the abstract.
Indeed positivism and the contradiction are abstractions. They must be
examined in their concrete form if the link is to have any practical-
theoretical value.
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Bukharin's Positivism and the Party/Bureaucracy Contradiction
The Bolshevik Revolution had a reactionary impact upon the
agricultural structure of Russia. It actually undid some of the more
important reforms instituted under Stolypin. In addition, the cultural
differences between the proletariat and the peasantry made the smychka
a tenuous alliance. What was to be done in this context? Lenin ad-
vocated two general programs which became the defining character of NEP.
First, peasant agricultural production must become a rural cooperative
effort organized around socialist principles. Second, the old peasant
world view must be replaced with a conscious revolutionary socialist
world view. These two programs must be completed in unison. After
Lenin's death, the primary responsibility to complete these tasks was
left to the united leadership of the party. Since Bukharin was the
focal point of ideological leadership in the party, the task fell heavy
upon his shoulders.
Although Bukharin's praxis during NEP favored the peasantry, the
implementation of his programs was mechanical. The party could not
educate the peasantry on the basis of Bukharin's work. There are four
concrete political reasons for this failure. First, positivism becomes
a dead testament in praxis. In other words, positivism was like
preaching to the peasantry. Party cadre were ineffective in explaining
the reasons for the needs of rural cooperatives, because the peasants
couldn't understand the world view from which these reasons evolved;
they remained within their pre-revolutionary world view. The confron-
tation between these world views exploded with Stalin's revolution from
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above. Stalin invoked the political, rather than the cultural solution.
Second, positivism in the practical world tends to establish a caste-
like hierarchy defined primarily by those who know and those who don't
know, or more simply rulers and ruled. Certain privileges accompany
this caste-like formation. A party cadre could feel superior, in the
sense that he or she is the one who knows. Positivism inadvertantly
manifests a new elite who in times of revolutionary change provide
continuity with the past. These elites lack the organic character of the
original party members. Thus, they are easily moved and shifted within
the bureaucracy. It therefore becomes easy for an individual to situate
himself comfortably within the boundaries of the mechanical bureaucracy.
Stalin, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
manipulated individuals within the bureaucracy to further confine his
rivals. Third, positivism turns marxism into a plan for the development
of socialism. Socialism, however, is not a plan but rather a working
out, a process of struggle with old forms of behavior. For example,
socialism is not the plan to establish cooperative farming, but the
actual struggle involved in establishing cooperative farming. Bukharin's
positivism in Historical Materialism imposes a doctrine upon the life of
society where that life is yet to be created. A doctrine develops as the
result of creating life and not vice-versa. Finally, rival programs
within the ruling party could not challenge the party with a popular
presentation to the smychka . Trotsky in 1923 and 1926, and Bukharin in
1928-29 challenged Stalin's programs within the confines of the party/
bureaucracy. They feared the mass to the extent that exposure could
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destroy the party's authority. They couldn't appeal to the smychka
because they wouldn't have understood the high level argumentation. They
failed to see the educational value of presenting their discussions to
the mass. By the time the party had decided upon a major collectivi-
zation effort, Bukharin was too thoroughly entrenched in the party/
bureaucracy to make an appeal to the smychka .
On the whole, positivism demands an elite organization which
assumes the mass too ignorant to understand high level philosophy. As
a result, they simplify it; they make it common sense without having
first destroyed the common sense of the old world view. In the end, the
mass laughs, and the party seeks revenge.
Gramsci sums it up best.
The popular element "feels" but does not always know or
understand; the intellectual element "knows" but does not
always understand and in particular does not always feel.
The two extremes are therefore pedantry and philistinism on
the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other.
Not that the pedant cannot be impassioned, far from it.
Impassioned pedantry is every bit as ridiculous and dangerous
as the wildest sectarianism and demagogy. The intellectual's
error consists in believing that one can know without under-
standing and even more without feeling and being impassioned
(not only for knowledge in itself but also for the object of
knowledge): in other words that the intellectual can be an
intellectual (and not a pure pedant) if distinct and separate
from the people-nation, that is, without feeling the elemen-
tary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore
explaining and justifying them in a particular historical
situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of
history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifi-
cally and coherently elaborated - i.e., knowledge. One cannot
make politics-history without this passion, without this
sentimental connection between intellectuals and people-nation.
In the absence of such a nexus the relations between the in-
tellectual and the people-nation are or are reduced to, relation-
ships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order; the intellec-
tuals become a caste, or a priesthood (so-called organic
centralism)
.
^
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Those who know but cannot feel the elementary emotions of the mass are
external to the process of cultural education. They are external
mediators rather than internal mediators. This is the point at which
Gramsci' s disassociation from the "social force" ruling the Soviet
Union becomes concrete.
What did Gramsci think of Leninism? By 1926, Gramsci had acquired
an acute knowledge of Lenin's work. Overall, he viewed Leninism as
(1) relations between the party and the mass, and (2) the work of
21
persuasion rather than expulsion. ^ He heartily welcomed the Bolshevik
22
Revolution as the "triumphant seizure of power by the Bolsheviks." He
felt the PSI should use this as a lesson for the Italian working class.
As we have seen in the above discussion, however, his jubilation was
short lived. Although he disagreed generally with Trotsky, by 1923 he
23
shared Trotsky's "disapproval over the trends in the Russian party."
These trends of course were away from the politics of persuasion towards
the politics of expulsion.
In 1926 the hegemonic crisis in the Soviet Union surfaced with
the expulsion of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Central Committee
of the Party. In October of 1926, Gramsci sent a letter to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union urging unity, but
not "mechanical and forced" unity. He concludes the letter:
Comrades Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Kamenev have made a powerful
contribution to our revolutionary education; they have sometimes
corrected us vigorously and sternly; they have been our teachers.
It is especially to them that we turn now, as to those most res-
ponsible for the present situation, because we want to be sure
that the majority of the Central Committee of the U.S.S.R.,
(sic) if it wins, does not intend to press its victory too far,
and is willing not to employ excessive measures. 24
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As leader of the Communist Party of Italy, Gramsci's letter was official
communication between two parties. Togliatti, now the official Italian
delegate to the Comintern, received Gramsci's letter and replied
immediately. He informed Gramsci that he misunderstood the situation and
should not interfere. Gramsci's second letter, an even more vehement
denunciation of the party's action, was consigned to the wastebasket by
25
Togliatti.^ Shortly thereafter, Mussolini's fascists arrested Gramsci.
As Davidson points out, 1926 marks Gramsci's "spiritual disassociation
with Stalinism and therefore from the new trends of international
„26
communism.
In 1929, Gramsci was enraged further with the International's
attack upon social democracy. The Comintern discarded united front tac-
tics for a bankrupt policy which claimed the main threat was social
27democracy. We do not know if Gramsci was aware of Bukharin's fall,
but we speculate that when his borther Mario visited him in 1929 he in-
formed him of all the major events in the Soviet Union. In any event,
Gramsci's disassociation from the Soviet Union was complete and firm by
the time he wrote his critique of Bukharin's Popular Manual .
Although Gramsci remained true to the spirit of Leninism, as he
himself defined it, he clearly disassociated himself from Stalinism, in
short, from what Leninism had become. Bukharin, as a leader of the
Party, was as much responsible for the practical evolution of the Party
as was Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. Trotsky and Bukharin blindly played
up to the party/bureaucracy contradiction, while Stalin recognized it
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and used it to his personal advantage. Gramsci's critique of Bukharin's
Popular Manual represents an implicit critique of Bukharin's praxis and
the Leninist Party. As such, Gramsci's critique is a clue to an explana-
tion of the party-bureaucracy contradiction and Stalin's heinous solution.
CHAPTER VI
THE POLITICS OF POSITIVISM AND DIALECTICS: ITS MEANING TODAY
Marx's theory of ideology is the foundation upon which I have
examined Bukharin's praxis during NEP and Gramsci's immanent critique of
that praxis. Based upon our discussion it is clear than an incorrect
understanding of Marx's theory of ideology could have a dangerous impact
upon one's praxis, depending of course upon the importance of one's
leadership in the formation of a new historic bloc. Any group involved
in a revolutionary project which claims origin with the philosophy of
praxis should therefore take as its starting point an understanding of
Marx's theory of ideology, or if you will Gramsci's theory of hegemony.
This understanding should account for specific cultural, historical and
political forms in the country under question. Praxis should involve a
cultural as well as a political project. Praxis, however, must identify
those elementary emotions, the embryonic struggle as it exists at the
moment, in the life of the subaltern classes themselves. Anything less
is a contemporary form of blatant opportunism or left-wing sectarianism.
The opportunists would have us feel but not think; the sectarians would
have us think but not feel. Both will fail in their project.
Aside from the historically entrenched Marxist-Leninist Parties,
contemporary opportunists include those marxist social scientists who
2fancy positivism. They breathe a redundant simplification of philosophy
of praxis because their "knowledge" informs them of the not too complex
minds of the dominated classes. Their failure lies precisely in the fact
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that they assume it necessary to make philosophy of praxis common sense
for the mass. This is blantant chauvinism, opportunism. They condescend
the mass. Their failure in praxis is inevitable since they assume that
the mass will logically choose socialism once it sees the light. Perhaps
they themselves can't see the light for all the smoke fuming from their
ivory towers.
Contemporary sectarian organizations include the multi-form and
recently emerged Marxist-Leninist Parties. Although many in number,
their organizational structure clings dogmatically to the exact reading
of polemics several decades old. They read and re-read Lenin to make
sure they have the nationalism question right. It is interesting, though,
that they converge with the opportunists on the question of knowledge —
they have it and will lead the masses to socialism. Their failure in
praxis is equally inevitable since they assume correct line will lead a
passive mass into revolution.
What is left? Perhaps the correct question should be what is
left of the left? When you take away the flowery illusions of teachers
in their ivory towers and the party organizations from emotionally un-
balanced Marxist-Leninist misfits, what is left? Real life struggle
remains; on-going struggle, despite its setbacks and sometimes incoherent
national character, remains to confront bourgeois hegemony in the United
States. A fellow comrade has answered this best.
In 1968 there was no energy crisis, runaway inflation,
stagnating economy, chemical and radioactive poisoning of the
earth, air and water. Or rather they were not issues, although
they were there, either actually or potentially and predictably.
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We learned about them, how they affect us, how dangerous they
are and how to fight them because we were kicked out of the
political parties, denied the positions within the System,
purged from the ivory towers of academia. Banished to living
and working on Che outside, we had to take a hard and self-
interested look at what affected us and our neighbors. We had
to support our neighbors and seek their support through our
own small, local organizations. We had to replace the frater-
nity of protest with a real community of resistance. We had
to replace the loss of government and corporate-controlled
centers of learning by carrying learning, music, art and poetry
in our back pockets, sharing and supporting them any way we
could. We found out that Culture was not something that was
locked up at night in a library, but the life of a people. We
found that Environment was not just an empty, "unspoiled" wild-
erness, but the health, life and joy of people. We learned
that the mere redistribution of wealth, power and privilege
within a system that dehumanizes the people under it, that denies
their worth or worthy effort, was insufficient, even impossible,
without radically changing or abolishing the system itself.
We have not given up. We have not gone away. The
struggles of the last ten years were worthwhile, not only
for the sake of the victories won, but also for the sake
of the defeats and the growth and learning made necessary
by those defeats.
3
In recent years, an active interest in Bukharin has developed.
Western scholars have begun an extensive revision of official Soviet
historiography. A reassessment of Bukharin' s role in Soviet history
is included in this revision. Today there is a movie in Italy, a play
in Britain, and many books and articles which explicitly recognize
Bukharin' s alternative. The development of Eurocommunism with its
gradual mixture of socialist and capitalist relations, and pluralistic
4
democratic approaches converges with the Bukharinist spirit. A similar
interest in Gramsci, it appears, has developed with the multiple publi-
cation of his works, and books about the man, in many different languages
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The development of these two interests provides a renewed meaning
for the critically inclined democratic movements in the West. On the one
hand, we are able to restate our historic relationship with the Bolshevik.
Revolution since it no longer implies Stalinism. We can identify with
Bukharin's alternative because it denies the essentially Stalinist
features of the contemporary structure of the Soviet Union. On the other
hand, we are able to reassess the meaning of marxism as it relates to our
revolutionary project in the West. Gramsci' s interpretation of marxism
offers us an alternative to the dogmatically entrenched Marxist-Leninist
parties in the West. In my opinion, we should find a good deal of
refurbished spirit in our studies of Bukharin and Gramsci. We should
not, however, locate our own project in the works of these two historic
revolutionary figures. While we may find a great spiritual identifica-
tion with the struggles of these two men, we should not read their works
with the intent of implementing one of their ideas as the correct
marxism. As Gramsci once said, marxism is a living project.
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1. Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings , op. cit
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p. 149.
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Chapter VI
1. I would include two organizations here: The Communist Party, U.S.A.
and the Socialist Party.
2. I have nothing to say for the non-marxist positivists since they do
not seem to me to be a real danger. As I have tried to point out,
the marxist positivists are the real threat.
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3. Eric Steinmetz, "A Look at 1968, now Ten Years Gone," North Country
Anvil
,
No. 29, Winter, 1979, p. 8.
4. See for example, Stephen F. Cohen, "Why Bukharin's Ghost Still
Haunts Moscow," The New York Times Magazine
,
December 10, 1978,
Section 6, p. 146-158.
5. See for exaple, Roy Medvedev, "Bukharin's Last Years," New Left
Review
,
No. 109, May-June, 1973, p. 49-73. (Translated by Helen
Jamieson)
.
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ABSTRACT
Marx's theory of ideology is examined from the perspective that
consciousness and material conditions contribute equally to the develop-
ment of superstructural formations in society. There are four elements
in Marx's theory: philosophical, economic, political, and historical.
Each of these elements is explored in terms of the 'early' and 'later'
Marx. It is asserted that class struggle mediates historical conscious-
ness and production forces, and actively creates the polity and culture.
Class struggle is praxis. This understanding of Marx's theory of
ideology is used as a philosophical base to examine Nikolai Bukharin's
leadership role in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the
period of New Economic Policy. Bukharin interpreted marxism as
sociology in his publication, Historical Materialism . In it, Bukharin
substituted a positivist methodology for the rational dialectic found
in Marx's theory of ideology. In his struggle with Stalin in 1929,
3ukharin lost. Bukharin's praxis failed because his political activity
was confined within the upper echelons of the party. This is referred to
as the party/bureaucracy contradiction. This contradiction is the
superstructural manifestation of a structural contradiction between the
peasantry and the proletariat. The contradiction is also related to
3ukharin's positivism. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian communist, wrote a
critique of Bukharin's marxism in 1929. His critique is used to support
the author's claim that there is a relationship between Bukharin's
positivism and his failure in praxis during NEP. It is concluded that
the current effort to reinterpret Bukharin 1 s role during NEP should
derive great inspiration from the man and his efforts rather than his
theoretical ideas. In addition, marxist academics and revolutionaries
should examine their role in light of the historical context for the
politics of positivism and dialectics.


